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INTRODUCTION

There are certain questions in the intellectual discourse of a nation that never seem to go
away. Among the top of this list is certainly the perennial question of “why is there no socialism
in the United States?” This Question has been asked and answered so many times, that one
would be hard pressed to find an answer that has not yet been suggested. While countless
thinkers have pondered the various answers, not enough attention has been paid to the actual act
of asking. Because, though the Question has been repeated endlessly, it has not remained static.
The Question has meant different things to different people at different times. Not only have the
questioners changed, but also so have their reason for asking it, as well as even the Question
itself.
The Question’s origins can be traced back to Karl Marx. Marx’s theories differed from
the prevailing socialist thought of the day. Early socialists, such as Henri de Saint-Simon, Robert
Owen, and Charles Fourier, held more abstract, distant views of a perfect society, which, while
egalitarian, were often elitist and based on the premise that revolution would arise without
struggle through reform measures. Marxian socialism on the other hand was grounded in the
experiences of the industrial revolution. Society was transformed as the largely agrarian and rural
populace of Europe made the transition into lowly paid urban factory workers in the new
industrial cities. This new industrial class became concentrated in large factories and workplaces,
when it increasingly engaged in collective action through trade unions and strikes.
While working as a co-editor of a radical leftist newspaper in Paris (1843-1845), Marx
experienced the waves of worker strikes and uprisings spreading through Europe, which
convinced him that the transformation of society could only succeed through the participation of
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the working class. Society was being split into two opposing classes, the property-owning
bourgeoisie, and the working class, or proletariat, whose only material possession was their
labor. Marx foresaw the continuing polarization of society leading to a unification of the working
class through common struggle and their realization of their common class interests (class
consciousness), which would lead to ever increasing conflict between the classes and the
inevitable revolution.
Marx’s theories were also grounded in his study of the British mining and textile
industries. Setting himself apart from the “utopian socialists” that preceded him (a term he
applied pejoratively), Marx tried to base his revolutionary theories on what he believed were
scientific observations of historical development. This application of Marxist science to
historical development became his theory of “historical materialism.” First elucidated in 1859, it
stated that all forms of social structures are based on a society’s economic system of production,
and people’s place in relation to it:
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations,
which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given
stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these
relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation,
on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite
forms of consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general
process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that
determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.1

Marx held that the modes of production changed throughout human history and this is what spurs
revolutionary changes to society:

1

Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), 3.
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At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into
conflict with the existing relations of production or… From forms of development of the
productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social
revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the
transformation of the whole immense superstructure.2

These shifts, he suggested, occur as part of a natural progression of society. The most
recent one was the shift from feudalism to capitalism. He prophesized that the socialist mode of
production would emerge in a post-capitalist economic system when the accumulation of capital
was no longer sustainable due to falling rates of profit and social conflict arising from the
contradictions between the level of productive technology and the capitalist form of social
organization. A socialist society would be one where the mode of production was designed to
directly satisfy human needs, with the working-class cooperatively or publicly owning the means
of production, which would then lead eventually to the final shift to the classless, stateless ideal
of communism.
So for socialists, the transition from capitalism to socialism was natural and inevitable.
Capitalism simply had matured to the point where it was no longer sustainable. In this theory, the
further advanced a country was industrially, the more radical and closer to the workers’
revolution it should be. As Marx put it “the country that is more developed industrially only
shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future.”3 And this is where the United States
comes in. Though a late bloomer, by the late nineteenth century the United States was advancing
industrially at a rapid rate.
Marx celebrated the history of the United States’ Working Men’s parties of the 1820s and
1830s as some of the first labor-oriented political organizations in the world. Emanating from of
2
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the concerns of craftsmen and skilled journeymen over their low social and economic status, the
members of the Working Men’s parties, or “Workies,” pressed for universal male suffrage, equal
educational opportunities, protection from debtor imprisonment, greater financial security, and
shorter working hours.4 Marx and his partner, the German social scientist, political theorist, and
philosopher Friedrich Engels also admired the Knights of Labor (KOL), the first national labor
organization in the United States. Organizing along industrial lines, rather than the more
conservative craft model, the KOL engaged in struggles for the eight-hour workday without
regard to ethnicity, sex, or skill set in the years following the U.S. Civil War. Engels even went
as far as to advise the “backwards workers” of Britain to follow their example. The existence of
these unions was a sure sign of the advanced level of the working class of the United States. 5
Discussions of the theoretical importance of the United States spread through Marxist
circles. After the death of Marx and Engels, Karl Kautsky arguably became the world’s leading
Marxist thinker. Kautsky was an Austrian Marxist and served as the intellectual authority on
Marxism for the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), an organized socialist party that
had mass-membership and held representation in it’s nation’s government.6 “America shows us
our future,” Kautsky stated in 1902:
In America capitalism is making its greatest progress; it rules there more absolutely and with more
ruthlessness than anywhere else. The class struggles are sharpening there to the highest possible
degree.7

4

Maximilien Rubel, “Notes on Marx’s Conception of Democracy,” New Politics 1, no 2 (Winter 1962): 8385; Lewis Feuer “The North American Origin of Marx's Socialism,” The Western Political Quarterly 16, no. 1
(Mar., 1963): pp. 53-67
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Frederick Engels, “Preface to the American Edition,” The Condition of the Working Class in England
(1887),” (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1887/01/26.htm
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Dave Renton, Dissident Marxism: Past Voices for Present Times (New York: Zed Books Ltd., 2004), 60.
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Karl Kautsky, “Socialist Agitation Among Farmers in America,” International Socialist Review, 3
(September 1902), 148.
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Eduard Bernstein, SPD leader and later a leading proponent of “Revisionist” Marxism, a
reform-based Socialism that deviated from traditional Marxist thought, had declared in 1890,
“we see modern socialism enter and take root in the United States in direct relation to the
spreading of capitalism and the appearance of the modern proletariat.”8 Going even further,
August Bebel, one of the founders of the Social Democratic Workers Party of Germany (which
would merge with German Socialist Workers’ Party to form the SPD), declared confidently in
1907 that the “Americans will be the first to usher in a Socialist Republic.”9 Bebel’s faith
continued at least until 1912 when he restated that the United States would “be the first nation to
declare a co-operative commonwealth.”10
Beyond the confines of Marx’s homeland several socialist theoreticians repeated the
sentiment that the most developed country would lead the world into socialism. Henry Mayer
Hyndman, a British Marxist and founder of the English Social Democratic Federation and the
National Socialist Party (a leftist-Marxist party with no relation to Nazism), asserted in 1904,
“just as North America is to-day the most advanced country economically and socially, so it will
be the first in which Socialism will find open and legal expression.”11 In 1906, Jean Longuet, the
French socialist lawyer and grandson of Karl Marx, averred that Marxism was strongest “in the
new and already vast American socialist movement” than in any other country except Russia.12
Daniel De Leon, the combative leader the Socialist Labor Party of America, was ready to
accept the role assigned to socialists in the United States by historical materialism. De Leon

8

Eduard Bernstein, “Herr Sartorius von Waltershausen über den modernen Sozialismus in den Vereinigten
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the American Promised Land (New York: Oxford University Press 1970), 70.
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November 14, 1912.
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Henry Hyndman, “A Socialist Survey of the Time,” Justice, April 30, 1904
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Jean Longuet, “A Great Socialist Novel ‘The Jungle,’” La Revue socialiste, 264 (December 1906): 704705
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acknowledged this in 1904 before the Amsterdam Congress of the Socialist International, the
second incarnation of the global alliance of socialist and labor parties. "Taking into consideration
only certain cardinal principles [of Marxism],” stated De Leon, “the conclusion cannot be
escaped that America is the theatre where the crest of capitalism would first be shorn by the
falchion of socialism." A short while later, De Leon proclaimed to the 1906 convention of the
Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), the radical industrial trade union based in part on his
philosophy of Marxism mixed with syndicalism that, "If my reading of history is correct, the
prophecy of Marx will be fulfilled and America will ring the downfall of capitalism the world
over."13
However, Marx had been mistaken about the degree of radicalism in the United States.
The Working Men’s parties were not socialists, but rather advocated for a meritocracy in
capitalism. Their scope and view remained restricted to local issues, and their organization
would be short lived. The Knights of Labor were not socialists either, but promoted a producer
ethic of republicanism. The KOL peaked in 1886, and they too declined due to the problems of
an autocratic structure, mismanagement, and unsuccessful strikes. They also suffered when a
labor protest rally near Chicago’s Haymarket Square turned into a riot after someone threw a
bomb at police and eight anarchists were prosecuted for their alleged complicity in the attack.
The KOL’s reputation was forever tarnished by anarchy and violence as the more conservative
craft union federation, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) quickly supplanted it at the
center of labor in the United States.
For those whose understanding of historical materialism led them to conclude that the
United States should be the first to usher in worldwide revolution, the socialist movement faced a

13

Daniel De Leon, Proceedings of the Industrial Workers of the World (Chicago, 1906), 608; Daniel De
Leon, Flashlights of the Amsterdam Congress (New York: New York Labor News Co., 1904), 133.
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crisis. That the United States failed to meet its responsibilities called into question the validity of
their interpretation of socialism. And so began fascination with the question “why is there no
socialism in the United States?” The Question was originally an attempt by radicals to reconcile
their philosophy with reality, the query long outlasted its original impetus. It has passed from
generation to generation and as each new group takes up its mantle, they have come up with a
diversity of answers. Some involved groundbreaking concepts to explain the absence U.S.
socialism while others recycled responses that came long before. But all are novel in the sense
that they reflect the contemporary society of those who pose it. The inquiry into “Why is there no
socialism in the United States?” has been tailored to meet the specific the interests and needs of
each generation. The variety of answers to the Question reflects the experience of each
generation and its relation to broader forces in society, and the history of the United States.

PART ONE: Roast Beef and Apple Pie
Radicals and Reformers in an Irreconcilable Reality, 1900s-1940s

In the first half of the twentieth century the query “Why is there no socialism in the
United States?” was initially asked by radicals and early Socialist parties trying to resolve
practice and theory. Yet scholars sympathetic to Progressive reforms to regulate big business,
protect labor and initiate campaigns against corruption in the early years of the century in the
United States also sought to understand the absence of socialism, even if only to prevent it. By
the 1920s and 1930s, in contrast, the Communist Party sought to better understand it so they
could remedy the situation. The answers, in both cases, were generally confined to economic,
political and social factors. However, the Question was not an abstract exercise. Rather it held
real-world importance to thousands who sought either to preserve or change the society in which
they lived.

I.

That U.S. capitalism continued to grow, but not U.S. socialism posed a problem to
Marxist theorists who assumed the cultural and political superstructure of a society should reflect
its economic and technological structure. And so it was the Marxists themselves that were first to
address the Question of the absence of socialism in the United States. Marx and Engels proposed
a number of potential factors that explained why the United States was lagging. For example,
Marx and Engels accused U.S. socialists of being extreme and uncompromising in their
adherence to Marxist doctrines. Marx referred to socialists in the United States as “crotchety and
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sectarian,” while Engels in 1886 criticized the Socialist Labor Party (SLP), the first major U.S.
socialist party, for treating Marxism in a “doctrinaire and dogmatic way as something which has
got to be learnt by heart and which will then supply all needs without more ado. To them it is a
credo and not a guide to action.”14 Simultaneously, however, Marx and Engels also claimed that
U.S. citizens and other English-speaking people were unable to grasp complex concepts. Engels
asserted in 1887 that Marx and his’ works were “far too difficult for America at the present time.
The workers over there… are still crude, tremendously backward theoretically, in particular, as a
result of their general Anglo-Saxon and special American nature.”15
Marx and Engels also pointed to the diversity of the United States as an impediment to
radicalism. Ethnic and racial cleavages, according to them, were intentionally created to create
an obstacle to the workers’ movement. In a letter to the German-American Socialist Hermann
Schlüter in 1892, Engels wrote:
Your great obstacle in America, it seems to me, lies in the exceptional position of the
native workers… Now a working class has developed and has also to a great extent
organized itself on trade union lines. But it still takes up an aristocratic attitude and
wherever possible leaves the ordinary badly paid occupations to the immigrants, of whom
only a small section enter the aristocratic trade unions. But these immigrants are divided
into different nationalities and understand neither one another nor, for the most part the
language of the country. And your bourgeoisie knows much better even than the Austrian
Government how to play off one nationality against each other: Jew, Italians, Bohemians,

14

Engels to Sorge, February 8, 1890, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Selected Correspondence, 18461895, trans. Dona Torr (New York: International Publishers, 1942),449-450.
15
Engels to Sorge, March 10, 1887, Letters to Americans, Marx and Engels (New York: International
Publishers Co., 1953),177.
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etc., against Germans and Irish and each other, so that differences in the standard of life
of different workers exist, I believe in New York to an extent unheard of elsewhere.16

There were also political factors that impeded the emergence of a socialist party in the United
States. The “The Constitution,” Engels wrote in 1893, “causes every vote for any candidate not
put up by one of the two governing parties to appear lost. And the American… wants to
influence his state; he does not throw his vote away.”17
A final consideration proposed by Marx and Engels was the fact that the United States
was a “new nation.” Because it was founded as a result of settler colonialism in the seventeenth
through eighteenth centuries, it lacked many of the entrenched institutions and traditions of
Europe. Marx and Engels concluded this boded ill for the nascent republic. People of the United
States were “born conservative,” Engels explained in 1890, “just because America is so purely
bourgeois, so entirely without a feudal past and therefore proud of its purely bourgeois
organization.”18 And again in 1892:
It is… quite natural quite natural, that in such a young country, which has never known
feudalism and has grown up on a bourgeois basis from the first, bourgeois prejudices
should also be so strongly rooted in the working class. 19

This sociological explanation, as well as variations of its political, cultural, ethnic, and internal
answers, would repeat in some variety throughout all incarnations of this debate. Yet Engels and
Marx clung to the importance of economic factors, with Engels claiming in 1886 “even in
America the condition of the working class must gradually sink lower and lower.” Because of the

16

Engels to Schlüter, March 30, 1892 Selected Correspondence, 496-497.
Engels to Sorge December 2, 1893, “Unpublished Letters of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels to
Americans,” trans/ed. Leonard E. Mins Science and Society 2 (Spring 1938): 374.
18
Engels to Sorge, February 8, 1890, Selected Correspondence, 467.
19
Engels to Sorge, December 31, 1892, Selected Correspondence, 501.
17
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peculiarities of the U.S. situation, he added, “theory counts for nothing until it is imposed by dire
necessity.”20

II.

Early twentieth-century discussions of the prospect of socialism in the United States
centered around one of the most important scholarly analyses of this time “Warum gibt es in den
Vereinigten Staaten keinen Sozialismus? (1906),” (Why is there No Socialism in the United
States?), a question posed by German economist and sociologist Werner Sombart. Sombart later
aligned himself with Nazism, but at the time of this essay, he was one of the first pro-socialist
professors in Imperial Germany acknowledging the absence of socialism in the United States.
His prognosis for the country’s future was cautiously optimistic. He assumed that class conflict
would eventually increase in the United States and with it would come the arrival of socialist
movement.21
Before it did, however, Sombart believed U.S. socialists faced an uphill battle. This was
because the working class of the United States was much more conservative than his European
counterparts, especially German workers. The cause of the workers’ conservatism was
affluence.22 As Sombart famously, declared “all socialist Utopias came to nothing on reefs of
roast beef and apple pie.”23 Simply put, workers in the United States had significantly higher

20

Engels to Florence Kelley Wischnewetsky, February 3, 1886, Letters to Americans, 149-150; Engels to
Florence Kelley Wischnewetsky, August 13, 1886, Letters to Americans, 160.
21

Iring Fetscher, “Comment 2 on American Capitalism’s Economic Rewards (1974),” in Failure of a
Dream: Essays in the History of American Socialism, 2nd ed., eds. John H.M. Laslett and Seymour Martin Lipset
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 477.
22
Jerome Karabel, “The Failure of American Socialism Reconsidered,” Socialist Register, 16 (1979), 208.
23
Werner Sombart, Why is There No Socialism in the United States?, trans. Patricia M. Hocking and C.T.
Husbands (London: Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 1976), 105-106.
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incomes and standards of living than German workers. “The diet of the American worker is
much closer to that of [the] better-off [German] middle-class circles than to that of [the German]
class of wage laborers,” Sombart concluded.24 He reiterated that radicalism arises from economic
depredation. It is only when a group is sufficiently convinced that the present system holds no
likelihood of improvement that they will risk all that they have in attempting to overthrow it, he
argued. Conversely, if workers were content with their economic level they would not have the
desire to rebel and attempts to form a class-based political movement would fall on deaf ears.
Beyond simply attributing the rejection of radicalism to the high level of affluence,
Sombart portrayed a high level of social equality in the United States. The relationship between
labor and management, he contended, was not as adversarial as in Europe, and even the temper
of conversation between employee and employer had a much more respectful tone.25 Along with
social equality, came social mobility. The workers in the United States, Sombart concluded, had
a much better chance of climbing into a higher class than in Europe. If the working class
assumed that they stood a good chance of escaping the bottom rung of the economic ladder, then
they would be less inclined to change the system, and would put their efforts towards economic
endeavors rather than political.
Social mobility was part and parcel of geographic mobility. The abundance of land acted
as a safety valve for social tensions, Sombart explained. Geographic mobility offered workers an
“avenue of escape.” No matter how bad life was the working class always had the option (or at
least the belief in the option) to pack up and move to the unsettled west. Instead of working

24
25

Ibid., 105.
Ibid., 18-20.
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toward the reorganization of the capitalist system, Sombart thought that workers would simply
start life anew.26

III.

Despite all the obstacles that the working class in the United States faced, Sombart still
predicted socialism’s inevitable success when he declared it “…will in all likelihood come to
fullest bloom in the new world.”27 Sombart’s optimistic thesis went against standard Marxist
theory in that it proposed that as capitalism advanced, the conditions of workers would inevitably
deteriorate. Though the United States had the most developed capitalism, it appeared able to
continue to provide workers with an ever-increasing standard of living. This analysis came out of
an emerging debate in the European radical intellectual scene.
In one camp there were socialists who were less concerned with the exact predictions of
Marx and willing to alter or abandon central tenets of Marist philosophy, and so were more
willing to accept Sombart’s unappealing prognosis that capitalism was serving workers in the
United States well. Emile Vandervelde, the Belgian socialist, conceded in 1904 that in terms of
economic welfare, “no one seriously disputes that, all in all, American workers have a position
very superior to that of the European worker.”28 J. Keir Hardie, the Scottish socialist and British
Labour leader, repeated the belief in 1908 that “[U.S.] capitalism has a power of adaptability for
which some of its Socialist opponents do not make sufficient allowance.”29 The German Social
Democrat Ludwig Quessel cited statistical evidence in 1909 that showed the wage increases that

26
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provided U.S. workers with an almost “bourgeois standard of living” showed no signs of slowing
down.30 H.G. Wells, the famous English author of the novels The Time Machine (1895), The War
of the Worlds (1897), and The Invisible Man (1897), and member of the Fabian Society, a British
organization that advocated the advance of socialism principles through gradual reforms,
observed that in the United States, though “a growing proportion of wealth of the community is
passing into the hands of a small minority,” the growing income gap was disguised by “the
enormous increase of the total wealth.”31
In the other camp were socialist thinkers who held a deeper commitment to the precise
nature of Marxist concepts, and rejected Sombart’s analysis. Though U.S. socialist journalist and
editor of the International Soczalst Revzew, Algie Martin Simons, had translated and printed the
first half of Sombart’s essay in his publication, he ceased publishing the second half in 1907 after
he grew offended with the conclusion that U.S. capitalism defied Marxist philosophy and
denounced the “nonsense on the conditions of American workers.”32
Socialists seeking answers that explained the situation in the United States without
calling into question the soundness of Marist theory, like Morris Hillquit, founder and leader of
the Socialist Party of America and future Socialist candidate for mayor of New York City,
formulated explanations for the stunted growth of U.S. socialism that were in disagreement with
Sombart’s. Rejecting the reformism of much of the Sombart camp, Hillquit, was convinced that
revolution could not come through the existing political system and asserted that the unique state
of politics in the United States was to blame for the lack of an organized working-class party. He
contended that the U.S. electoral system was designed to limit the chances of a third party by

30
31

Ludwig Quessel, “K. Kautsky als Vulgärökonom,” Sozialistische Monatshefte, 15, no. 2 (1909): 1105.
H.G. Wells, The Future in America: A Search after Realities, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1906),
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Karabel, “The Failure of American Socialism Reconsidered,” 206.
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absorbing radicals into one of the two major coalition parties. Hillquit blamed the failure of the
Socialist party in the 1908 elections on the Democratic party which
revived all the slogans of its old time middle-class radicalism and re-instated the prophet
of that brand of radicalism, William J. Bryan, in the leadership of the party… The direct
and public endorsement of the Democratic Party by the officials of the American
Federation of Labor and their appeal to organized labor for active support of the
candidates of that party, could not but be detrimental to the socialist campaign.33

Hillquit’s view is borne out by the fact that as early as the 1820s, Jeffersonian Democrats
had coopted Working Men’s Parties.34 In 1872 the Democratic Party undercut radicals by
supporting Horace Greeley, a social reformer and member of the early utopian socialist
Fourierist movement, for president instead of David Davis, sitting Supreme Court Justice and
candidate of the Labor Reform Party, a short lived, political vehicle for the National Labor
Union, the first nationwide labor union in the United States.
Another example of the weakness of third political parties involved the neutralization of
the People’s Party, the largest and most sustained effort at a third party in the United States. Also
known as the “Populists,” the short-lived U.S. political movement was a loose coalition of
Farmers alliances and laborers united against eastern bankers, industrialists, railroad companies,
and elites in general. In the last decade of the 19th century, these agrarian radicals advocated for
an expanded currency, free coinage of gold and silver, public ownership of railroads, and a
graduated federal income tax. The movement grew fast and even gained the support of labor,
small business, and socialists, although it was co-opted when the Democratic Party adopted
many of its reform planks. When the Democrats ran agrarian reformer William Jennings Bryan
33

Morris Hillquit, History of Socialism in the United States, (New York: Funk and Wagnalls Co., 1910),

349.
34
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16
as their presidential candidate in 1896, the Populists endorsed him, in effect fusing the parties
together.35 This trend was so ominous that the German intellectual Philipp Rappaport, writing in
the socialist journal of the SPD Die Neue Zeit in 1907, argued that socialists in the United States
should focus on converting the Democratic party, because attempting to work around it in a third
party was hopeless.36
Other socialists looking to explain away the incongruity of socialism in the United States
turned to the unique characteristics of the U.S. working class itself. Franz Mehring, a German
socialist and historian, claimed that because the United States was “still an overwhelmingly
agricultural country,” class consciousness had not fully developed. 37 Another difference
attributed to the U.S. Socialists was their ideology. Rather than lacking revolutionary fervor,
however, some like H.G. Wells accused it of having too much. Wells contended that Socialism
of the United States was “a fierce form of socialist teaching… far more closely akin to the
revolutionary socialism of the continent than to the constructive and evolutionary socialism of
Great Britain… It is a Socialism reeking with class feeling and class hatred and altogether
anarchistic in spirit…”38 It was this radical form of socialism that prevented Socialists in the
United States from making the proper concessions these analysts believed were necessary to
enact real gains. Echoing Marx and Engels’ criticisms of the U.S. Party, Vladimir Lenin, the
Russian socialist thinker and future leader of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the Soviet
Union, made his point in 1907:
What Marx and Engels criticize in British and American socialism is its isolation from
the labour movements. The burden of all their numerous comments on… the American
35
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Age, vol.1, Sources of Contemporary Radicalism, eds. Seweryn Bialer and Sophia Sluzer, (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1977), 61.
36
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Socialists is the accusation that they have reduced Marxism to a dogma, to a ‘rigid
orthodoxy’… that they are incapable of adapting themselves to the theoretically helpless
but living and powerful mass labour movement that is marching alongside them.”39

Without being able to make concessions, this argument suggested, the Socialists could not
mobilize workers in the United States, and Socialism stood no chance.
Karl Kautsky also furthered the idea that the make-up of the U.S. working class was to
blame. Kautsky contended that the absence of a native working class, caused by ever-increasing
waves of immigration, prevented a working class movement from forming.40 Kautsky also
highlighted The United States’ specific historical development. The United States, unlike
Europe, had no direct feudal past. Much of the class consciousness and political organization of
the European socialist organizations stemmed from the fight for basic political rights. However,
in the United States basic political rights were already guaranteed to much of the public. As
Kautsky put it, “the struggle for freedom is very much superior to the effortless possession of a
freedom that others have won before.”41
The lack of a large-scale struggle for political rights in the United States was a popular
explanation for the United States’ unique situation. Writing in 1907, Vladimir Lenin pointed to
“the absence of any at all big, nation-wide democratic tasks facing the proletariat” as the reason
for failure of socialism in the United States. Lenin added that the basic political liberties in the
United States actually produced “the complete subjection of the proletariat to bourgeois politics;
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the sectarian isolation of the [socialist] groups… not the slightest success of the Socialists among
the working masses in the elections, etc.”42
Morris Hillquit agreed with Lenin that the success of the United States in political
freedoms actually undermined the Socialists ability to garner support:
Another check to the progress of the socialist movement in the United States was to be
found in the political institutions of the country: the working classes of the European
countries were as a rule, deprived of some political rights enjoyed by other classes of
citizens, and the common struggle for the acquisition of those rights was frequently the
first cause to draw them together in a political union.
In the United States, however, the working men enjoyed full political equality at all
times, and thus had one less motive to organize politically on a class basis.43

Following Hillquit’s line of reasoning, Max Beer, the Austrian-born Marxist journalist,
focused on the lack of middle-class political movements as the saboteur of U.S. socialism. In
Marxist theory, according to Beer, the bourgeoisie would struggle for political rights by
mobilizing the proletariat:
The rise and effervescence of Socialist Labour movements at various periods were, as a
rule, the concomitant phenomena of middle-class upheavals, which, directly or indirectly
mobilized some strata of the working class…[and which] were accompanied by an inrush
of Socialists ideas… [However] in the United States middle class movements against a
privileged upper class or personal monarchy could not arise, for these phenomena did not
exist, and there was no need to mobilize the classes for the fight.44

Without being mobilized by the middle class in their struggle for political rights, wrote
Beer, the working class in the United States never gained the political acumen and consciousness
42
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necessary to take it one step further and advocate on behalf of their own class. Variations on
these explanations would soon become increasingly useful, as the potential for a socialist
movement in the United States became even more in doubt.

IV.

It was not only radicals who addressed the absence of U.S. socialism. Political reformers
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century became increasingly interested in the
problems brought up by industrialization and modernization, however, “Progressives” sought to
address the most egregious abuses of capitalism in order to save the system from more radical
changes. This period of social activism saw urban, middle-class reformers support a greater role
of the government regarding, political corruption, regulation of big business, labor rights, and
social welfare, including involvement in enacting the direct primary, initiative, referendum,
recall, women’s suffrage. Progressive Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and
Woodrow Wilson pursued anti-trust action, established the Federal Reserve System (1913),
which set up the central banking system in the Unites States, and witnessed passage of the
Seventeenth Amendment (1913), which provided the direct election of U.S. senators.45
Progressive concepts also spilled over into academia. In what would become known as
the “Progressive School,” historians shifted away from the Germanic style of “scientific” history,
and the rigorous analysis of primary documents to extract larger historical truths.46 Drawing from
their contemporary experiences, progressive scholars such as Frederick Jackson Turner, Charles
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A. Beard, and Vernon L. Parrington used economic criteria to evaluate the past and saw conflict
as a major driving force throughout U.S. history.
Turner’s 1893 essay, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” presented
to the American Historical Association, argued that in its political and socioeconomic effects,
three centuries of westward movement of population across the continent provided a
democratizing experience that was uniquely “American.” This concept, known as the frontier
thesis, was identical to Sombart’s emphasis on geographic mobility, except instead of lamenting
the class impediment, Turner fear the closing of the frontier: "A new national development is
before us without the former safety valve of abundant resources open to him who would take.
Classes are becoming alarmingly distinct."47
Beard embraced the concept of class struggle, but mainly in terms of farmers and
middle-class producers versus financial elites, not the industrial working class, in works such as
An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution (1913) and The Rise of American Civilization
(1927) that argued that such conflict was defining the featuring of U.S. history. Parrington’s
Main Currents in American Thought (1927–1930), in turn, focused on U.S. literary and
intellectual history by proposing a sharp divide between elitist Hamiltonian currents and the
populist Jeffersonian forces.
Progressive approaches characterized U.S. history as a struggle between the people
versus the elites. This, however, was not a Marxist concept of class struggle. Turner, Beard, and
Parrington saw private property and free enterprise as the best way to ensure there were
opportunities for ordinary citizens of the United States, and thus private property should be
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protected. Instead of celebrating the past, however, progressive scholars looked for lessons to
move forward and justify reforms to save capitalism.
The most important academic analysis of the Question in the Progressive era came from
Selig Perlman, a scholar in the academic school of industrial labor economics and history that
took root at the University of Wisconsin.48 Perlman was born in Congress Poland (a part of
Tsarist Russia), to parents active in the Zionist and labor movement. After immigrating to the
United States in 1918, he attended the University of Wisconsin at Madison, where he studied
under Frederick Jackson Turner and the progressive labor historian and economist John R.
Commons, with whom he would work for years to come. Under their influences, Perlman
abandoned an earlier dedication to Marxism in favor of a Progressive approach to the study of
labor.
In works such as The History of Labor in the United States (written with Commons, 10
vols., 1918) and A Theory of the Labor Movement (1928), Perlman questioned the argument
proposed by Lenin and others that criticized unions for too often pursuing higher wages and
better working conditions (the so-called “bread-and-butter” issues), rather than putting their
efforts towards revolution. Lenin had suggested in his extremely influential political pamphlet of
1902, “What Is to Be Done?” that it is the role of intellectuals and professional revolutionaries to
enter the labor movement and guide it along.49 Perlman agreed with Lenin yet he claimed that
the working class was inherently conservative and that radicalism only arose from the agitation
of intellectuals imposing their own anti-capitalist beliefs upon them.50
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Unlike Lenin, Perlman proposed that the conservative nature of the working class was a
positive thing.51 Unions formed, Perlman argued, as a means for workers to maintain high wages.
It was correct, not an aberration, for unions to focus solely on wages and working conditions, he
wrote. In this "business unionism" model of labor, members defined the goals of the union.52
These conservative features of the proletariat particularly held true for U.S. workers Perlman
concluded. It was for this reason there was no socialism in the United States.
The causes of conservatism among U.S. workers ran the gamut, according to Perlman.
Partially, it was due to the particular nature of the U.S. national character. Being rooted in
puritanism with its emphasis on individualism, he wrote, the ethos of workers in the United
States was not compatible with the social collectivism needed for socialism. Perlman also
suggested that worker conservatism had to do with the racial and ethnic makeup of the United
States. Not only did ethnic heterogeneity prevent deep class affiliations from forming, but the
waves of immigrants had made it so there was not a “settled” wage earning class to organize.53
Perlman suggested that these immigrants and their offspring were conservative by nature,
primarily focused on improving their inferior lot, therefore working to support, rather than
challenge the capitalist system. 54
Revealing his affinity with Progressives, Perlman put economic reasons at the forefront
of the reasons why the United State was unsuitable for socialism. Agreeing with Sombart and
many socialist commentators, he saw the U.S. class structure as much more fluid than in Europe.
This fluidity offered “the opportunity for the exceptional workman to desert his class and set up
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in business for himself.”55 If workers in the United States could reasonably hope to escape the
confines of their class, the argument went, they would not go to great lengths to try to change it.
According to Perlman, this egalitarian class system produced a unique political system in
the United States, which was the most important feature in inhibiting the growth of radicalism.
Agreeing with the likes of Kautsky, Lenin and Hillquit, Perlman pointed out that universal
manhood suffrage was attained in the United States without much struggle. This “free gift of the
ballot” as he would come to call it,
…came to labor at an early date as a by product of the Jeffersonian democratic
movement. In other countries, where the labor movement started while the workingmen
were still denied the franchise, there was in the last analysis no need of a theory of
“surplus value” to convince them that they were a class apart and should therefore be
‘class conscious.’ There ran a line like a red thread between the laboring class and the
other classes. Not so where that line is only an economic one.56

Perlman contended that, unlike other working class political movements like the Chartists
in England, the U.S. working class had primarily economic demands.57 Without a political
component to the movement, workers in the United States never became politically active and
were content to settle their grievances through unions and strikes rather than developing a labor
based political organization. For Perlman, it was this focus on economic issues that led to the
development of “business unionism” and the anti-political, job-consciousness approach of U.S.
labor. Perlman’s view not only coincided with the Progressive scholarly focus on economics, but
also served the Progressive agenda by highlighting the overall conservatism of the working class
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in the United States as well as focusing on the potential of the United States political system to
both implement and prevent social change.

V.

The outlook for the United States’ conversion to socialism diminished even further as
events surrounding World War I stunted the hope of radical political action. At home the United
States resorted to repression to silence dissent through measures such as the Espionage Act of
1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918, which made it a crime to write, publish or even talk about the
armed forces in a negative way and allowed the government to prosecute scores of radicals. And
following the War, the persecution continued as radicals were denied political rights, subject to
exclusionary laws, arrested, and even killed. The First Red Scare (1919-1921) was spurred in
large part by one of the most lasting outcomes of the WWI, the Russian Revolution of 1917.
The Russian Revolution enabled a Marxist party to assume the reigns of power of a
nation for the first time in history. This would have profound effects on radicalism the world
over, including the United States. The revolutionary Bolsheviks taking the title of the
Communist Party, assumed the mantle of the leaders of the worldwide workers’ movement
following the creation of the Soviet Union. Through the creation of the Third, or Communist
International (Comintern), they tried to refashion the world’s Marxist parties in their image. In
the United States the left wing of the Socialist party split off in 1919 to form the Communist
Party of America, joining with the Communist Labor Party to form the Communist Party USA
(CPUSA) in 1920. Only months after its founding, the CPUSA had 60,000 members, while the
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Socialist party had only 40,000.58 This would not only help cripple the American Socialist party
by producing deep fractures within it but would incite further repression from government
authorities, thereby changing the entire nature of the debate surrounding socialism in the United
States.
It was now clear that the United States would not be the first country to usher in
socialism and the Communists were faced with the task of explaining why. This was
theoretically important as a means to reconcile Marxist theory that socialism would first appear
in the country that was most advanced industrially with the fact that it actually began in the
primarily agrarian and industrially weak state of Russia. In addition, this was a practical
problem. Since the goal of the Comintern, initially, was to spread revolution worldwide, it
needed to be determined what approaches, if any, should be taken in the United States.
Communists needed to understand why there was no socialism in the United States. To resolve
this contradiction Communist thinkers like Grigory Zinoviev, the Bolshevik revolutionary and
leader of the Comintern, claimed there was something about the United States that made it
different from the rest of the countries. Instead of the more advanced capitalist countries
collapsing first, the United States was affluent enough to stave off the inevitable deterioration of
capitalism longer than most, at least temporarily.59
This theory was expounded in 1926 when Zinoviev first declared that instead of the
anticipated decline, U.S. Capitalism was “on the upgrade.”60 Hungarian Communist and
Comintern functionary for the CPUSA, John Pepper, incorporated this line of reasoning into his
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address to the Ninth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern in 1928.
Pepper identified it as number one out of his five “fundamental differences” between the United
States and the Europe:
1. American capitalism is still on the upgrade as compared with European capitalism. 2.
American imperialism is still increasing in power on almost every front of world
politics… 3. The American working class as a whole is in a privileged position compared
with the European working class… 4. …The working class of America has not yet
reached that stage of class-consciousness and homogeneity which is the prerequisite of
constituting itself as an independent political factor. 5. There is no marked tendency of a
left trend on a national scale in the American working class.61

This explanation provided the Communists a way to explain away the peculiarity that was the
United States. They accepted that U.S. capitalism would decay and with it would come the
inevitable proletariat revolution. They only sought to update Marxist theory in light of the
unimaginable success of United States industry, and adjust their expectations, and tactics, for the
U.S. branch of the Communist Party accordingly. As Jay Lovenstone, then general secretary of
the CPUSA, put it blankly, “objective conditions prevailing in the United States are not favorable
for the development of a mass Communist Party.”62
However, Joseph Stalin, the Bolshevik revolutionary who by the late 1920s had assumed
undisputed control of the Soviet Union and Comintern, rejected this defeatism. Stalin chastised
the U.S. Party for believing in what he coined as “American exceptionalism” by inflating the
distinctiveness of U.S. capitalism. Instead, Stalin declared that the collapse of worldwide
capitalism was nigh, and returned the United States as the theoretical harbinger of socialist
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success. At a speech to the American Commission of the Comintern in 1929 he expounded the
new position:
The Communist Party of America is one of the few communist parties in the world upon
which history has placed tasks of decisive importance from the point of the international
revolutionary movement… Many seen to think that the general crisis of capitalism will
not affect America. This, of course, is wrong… I think that the moment is not far off
when a revolutionary crisis comes in the United States, it will mark the beginning of the
end of world capitalism.63

While admitting that the United States, like any other country, had “special peculiarities,”
Stalin warned that it was “incorrect to base the activities of the Communist Party on these
specific features, since… the general features of capitalism… are the same in all countries.”64
Stalin had restored the significance of the United States in Marxist theory while simultaneously
ending its remarkableness.
At the same time, not all socialists followed the Communist party line. Bolshevik
revolutionary and soon-to-be-exiled Soviet leader Leon Trotsky saw U.S. capitalism as not yet
“having exhausted itself,” and “incomparably stronger and more solid than European
capitalism.”65 According to Trotsky, the retarded development of class consciousness in the
United States was due to immense economic power, which allowed it “to apply the traditional
method of the British bourgeoisie to fatten the labor aristocracy in order to keep the workers in
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shackles.”66 As long as U.S. capitalism was growing, it could provide enough workers with
enough benefits to prevent the growth of socialism.
Leon Samson, a radical U.S. socialist, instead connected the absence of socialism to
values in the United States. Samson claimed that instead of Marxism, “Americanism” was the
dominant ideology among U.S. workers, and with its creed of egalitarianism, Americanism
prevented socialism by making many in the United States believe that they already possessed
what socialism offered:
When we examine the meaning of Americanism, we discover that Americanism is to the
American not a tradition or a territory, not what France is to a Frenchman or England to
an Englishman, but a doctrine—what socialism is to a socialist. Like socialism,
Americanism is looked upon ... as a highly attenuated, conceptualized, platonic,
impersonal attraction toward a system of ideas, a solemn assent to a handful of final
notions—democracy, liberty, opportunity, to all of which the American adheres
rationalistically much as a socialist adheres to his socialism—because it does him good,
because it gives him work, because, so he thinks, it guarantees him happiness.
Americanism has thus served as a substitute for socialism. 67

In the 1930s by the CPUSA under the leadership of Earl Browder tried to exploit this connection
between Americanism and socialism. Under the slogan “Communism is 20th Century
Americanism” Browder tried to gain the party mainstream acceptance by portraying
Communism as an indigenous reform movement during the period of cooperation known as the
Popular Front (1935-1939).68 The CPUSA joined with Communist parties around the world in
making alliances with liberal and leftist groups in order to defend the world from the growing
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fascist threat as well as to take advantage of the weakened state of capitalism during the Great
Depression to make social advances.
The Communist party in the 1930s experienced unprecedented approval in the United
States. CPUSA membership swelled to over 65,000 as it organized the unemployed, created
"red" unions, and fought evictions of farmers and the working poor.69 The Party also championed
the rights of African Americans by offering aid and organization to poor black sharecroppers and
tenant farmers, as well as legal representation to the high-profile Alabama “Scottsboro Boys”
case, where it succeeded in freeing eight, young black men, wrongly sentenced to death.70
Politically, the Communist Party gained legitimacy when it aligned itself with President
Franklin D. Roosevelt and his administration’s “New Deal” reform (1933-1938), which sought to
save the capitalist system and prevent more radical forces from taking action with measures that
restructured the nation’s financial system, created employment through public work programs,
slowed farm and home foreclosure rates, and provided basic relief for the suffering public. This
was accompanied by the inclusion of Communists and radicals into the nation’s cultural sphere.
Michael Denning, American Studies Scholar, has termed it the “Cultural Front,” “the brief
moment when ‘politics’ captured the arts, when writers went left, Hollywood turned Red, and
painters, musicians, and photographers were ‘social-minded.’”71 Radicalism in the United States
was on an upswing
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PART TWO: No Feudalism, No Socialism
Consensus Scholars and the American Ethos, 1950s-1960s

The period following World War II saw a shift in the attempts to answer the Question
“Why is there no socialism in the United State?” While it was primarily within the realm of
radical thinkers in the first half of the century, by the second, it had been relegated to academia
and scholarly debate. By the time World War II ended and a Cold War between the United States
emerged radicalism had seemingly been destroyed. In the state of post-war stability and
prosperity, academics in the social sciences and history took up the question, not in an attempt to
learn how to usher in socialism, but instead to declare its demise. The answers primarily assumed
an overarching character or “ethos” of the United States that predestined them toward
moderation, and which caused the basic agreement or “consensus” that characterized the U.S.
past. These consensus scholars sought to prove to themselves, and their critics, that the failure of
socialism in the United States was inevitable. And so they asked: “Why, thank God, is there no
socialism in the United States?”

I.

The Popular Front strategy ended temporarily with the signing of the non-aggression
Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi-Germany in 1939. With Hitler
and the Soviets in truce, Communist parties were ordered to switch from a position of
cooperation with capitalist regimes to one advocating non-intervention in the growing
“imperialist” war. With this abrupt about-face, the CPUSA lost much of the goodwill it had
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earned the decade prior, especially as the Roosevelt administration ramped up its interventionist
propaganda campaign. Though the Soviet Union and the United States became allies once more
as they joined the war against the Axis Powers after Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in
1941 and the U.S. Communist movement saw a resurgence of membership during World War II
to its all-time high of 85,000, the marriage would be short-lived.72
Revelations of overt anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, the Soviet-backed coup in
Czechoslovakia in 1948, the emergence of the Cold War, the growing awareness of the atrocities
committed under Stalin’s reign, and the brutal crushing of the Hungarian uprising in 1956
severely challenged the prospects for a global proletariat revolution. Instead of a decaying
advanced capitalist economy on the verge of collapse, moreover, the United States emerged from
the war as the most powerful economic and military nation in the world. Instead of the socialists’
hope of a return to the prewar state of depression, the United States experienced the greatest era
of economic prosperity in its history.
The Cold War brought heightened political repression against radicals at home that
included a fear campaign spreading paranoia over the infiltration of and influence over U.S.
institutions by communists. The Second Red Scare (1950-1956) as it was called, decimated the
remaining CPUSA members and drove the rest into hiding. The Socialist party, whose
membership had been dwindling for years, dropped out of electoral politics altogether after
garnering less than 100,000 votes in the 1952 presidential election. Radicalism in the United
States had declined significantly, and it appeared to many that socialism had officially failed.
The profound ideological shift in the United States helped bring about a transformation of
U.S. academic thought as well. By the 1930s the Progressive interpretation of history had begun
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to falter. Turner’s frontier thesis was increasingly seen as irrelevant to the modern industrial
society and scholars grew weary of the Beardian model solely based on economic conflict.73
World War II was the deathblow to progressivism. The view that mankind was always
progressing was shattered by the unprecedented level of violence and bloodshed surrounding the
war. How could one reconcile these horrors with liberal confidence in the constant betterment of
man? The stage was set for the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr to be the unlikely impetus for a
monumental shift in the historical profession. Starting out as a social gospel evangelical minister
in inner city Detroit, in the 1920s, Niebuhr soon became restless of Marxist doctrines, seeing
humans as more complex than economically driven, and identifying the irrational elements by
which people act against their own interests.
In a world torn apart by totalitarian regimes on both the right and the left, Niebuhr
recognized that civilization was not becoming more moral, that love and justice were not
prevailing. Using theological, psychological and classical Greek motifs, the theologian portrayed
a picture of man that was inherently flawed, one framed by a metaphorical “original sin.” In what
would be called Christian Realism, Niebuhr attacked utopianism as naïve and asserted that the
perfectibility of man was impossible. Despite this reduced belief in mankind, Niebuhr advocated
for action, often military, and claimed the only way to confront evil in the world was with
countervailing power, yet he insisted that democracy needed to separate from a state of
innocence. To to preserve its values, one needed to use institutions, power, and occasionally
coercion.
The works of Niebuhr would have remained obscure if Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. had not
adopted them. Distressed by rise of fascist regimes on the right and the pacifist line taken by the
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Communists before 1941, Schlesinger came to see threats from both the left and the right. In an
article for Life Magazine and later book titled The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom (1945),
he claimed individual freedom was more important than equality and that the moderates of the
world had more in common with each other than they had with the extremes and thus need to
form a coalition to fight for liberty.74 The "‘vital center’ refers to the contest between democracy
and totalitarianism, not to contests within democracy between liberalism and conservatism.” He
stated.75 This concept that conservatism and liberalism are actually mostly in agreement and
represent a moderate middle ground between the extreme left and right would became very
influential to a new generation of historians who had turned to Niebuhr and Schlesinger’s
concepts to replace the seemingly outdated progressive interpretation.
The U.S. historian Richard Hofstadter in his iconoclastic book, The American Political
Tradition (1948), first elucidated this theory of the moderation of the United States. Influenced
by the common experiences of a unified nation at war, followed soon after by the onset of the
Cold War against a common enemy and a period of prolonged prosperity, Hofstadter maintained
that conflict was not as important a force in U.S. society as the Progressives had once stressed.
Instead, a new generation of historians emerged to emphasize the shared values of people in the
United States and what brought them together as opposed to what divided them. The history that
stressed continuity or consensus throughout the U.S. past became known as the “CounterProgressive” or “Consensus” model and by the mid-1950s was firmly established as the
dominant school in U.S. scholarship.76
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II.

The consensus model was predicated upon the belief that the history of the United States
was marked by cooperation and moderation as opposed to conflict and extremism. At the center
of this was the assumption that something inherent in the ethos or character of the United States
was antithetical to radicalism. Since the lack of U.S. socialism was central to the entire
intellectual school, theories as to why socialism failed in the United States became central to
many of its interpretations of U.S. History.
The most influential of the consensus interpretations addressing the lack of socialism in
the United States came from the U.S. political scientist Louis Hartz. In his seminal work The
Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the
Revolution (1955), Hartz argues that the United States is founded on the concepts of the 17th
century English philosopher John Locke that espouse equality, liberty, representative democracy,
restraints on the government, civil rights, laissez faire-capitalism, and private property rights.
This form of Lockean liberalism, insists Hartz, became so deeply engrained within the United
States that radicalism could not find fertile ground:
For swallowing up both peasantry and proletariat into the “petit-bourgeois” scheme,
America created two unusual effects. It prevented socialism from challenging its Liberal
Reform in any effective way, and at the same time it enslaved its Liberal Reform to the
Alger dream of democratic capitalism.77
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The reason Hartz gave for this particularly strong tendency towards U.S. liberalism can
be summed up by his famous adage: “No feudalism, No socialism,” the fact that unlike Europe,
the United States lacked a feudal past:
It is not accidental that America which has uniquely lacked a feudal tradition has
uniquely lacked also a socialist tradition. The hidden origin of socialist thought
everywhere in the West is to be found in feudalism ethos… Everywhere in Europe, in
MacDonald’s England hardly less than in Kautsky’s Germany, socialism was inspired
considerably by the class spirit that hung over not from capitalism but from the feudal
system itself.78

For Hartz, The United States was a thoroughly bourgeois nation. It never experienced
feudalism, the pre-capitalist system based on the servitude of the peasants to the propertied
aristocratic class, and was founded entirely on liberal Enlightenment ideals. This was the cause
for the consensus in the United States. Instead of a history of conflict between classes over the
proper way to structure society, Hartz contended that throughout U.S. history both the right and
the left in the United States had agreed upon the basic social structure. The United States not
only lacked a socialist or radical left party, but also a Tory or extreme right segment of society. It
was, by nature, moderate. Because the United States was free from this feudal baggage, classlines were less permanent and this was the reason, according to Hartz, why there was less class
consciousness among U.S. workers, and therefore, less class conflict.
Along the same vein of Perlman’s “free gift of the ballot,” Hartz stressed how the United
States skipped the struggle for emancipation under feudalism since “socialism arises not to fight
capitalism but the remnants of feudalism itself…”79 The lack of feudalism in the United States
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also meant an absence of what Hartz called a “medieval corporate spirit.”80 Europeans peasant
under feudalism acted and thought in a much more collective manner. With this lacking in the
United States, the socialist had the impossible task of trying to recreate a form of collectivism
that had no place in the traditions of U.S. workers. Socialists failed in part because their lack of
understanding the peculiarities of the U.S. public led to their “persistent use of European
concepts of Marxism” where it was not applicable.81 So not only a pervasive liberalism, and an
obstructed class consciousness, but also a lack of collectivism can all be attributed to a lack of
feudalism, according to Hartz.
It should be noted that this focus on feudalism did not originate solely with Hartz. Going
back decades, thinkers including Marx, Engels, Sombart, Trotsky, Lenin, and Gramsci have all
made the connection between the United States’ unique position and its lack of a feudal past.82
Writing in 1906, H.G. Wells declared:
[My] chief argument is that the Americans started almost clear of medieval heritage, and
developed in... the modern type of productive social organization. They took the
economic conventions that were modern and progressive at the end of the eighteenth
century and stamped them into the Constitution as if they meant to stamp them there for
all time… America is pure eighteenth century 83

Under Hartz, however, this theory took on new dimensions. It perfectly encapsulated the
spirit of consensus scholarship in the post-war United States. Consensus historians shared a
common theoretical framework that citizen of the United States across the centuries had agreed
upon how to structure society, and that this agreement on democracy and liberal capitalism
80
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prevented conflict, diminished differences and explained the absence of extreme ideologies like
socialism.84

III.

While ranking as one of the most important explanations of American exceptionalism,
Hartz’s Liberal Tradition was not a celebration of American capitalism. Actually it lamented The
United States’ incapacity to deal with the complex realities of the modern world because of its
confinement within the liberal ethos.85 Viewed in this light, the Liberal Tradition could almost
be considered Marxist, in how it assumes the inevitability of socialism if the prescribed
precursors are in place.
Other consensus interpretations of U.S socialism were not as generous. It was this
generation that, instead of wondering when, or if, socialism would come to the United States,
declared emphatically that it would not. And in the geo-political landscape of the Cold War,
much of the scholarship surrounding radicalism was as much an obituary for socialism as it was
a victory cry for U.S. capitalism and national traditions of moderation.
For example, the jingoistic U.S. historian Daniel Boorstin in The Genius of American
Politics (1953) proclaimed it was the praiseworthy pragmatism of the U.S. public, which allowed
them to escape the destructive ideologies of Europe.86 Clinton Rossiter, the historian and
political scientist, refers to an all-encompassing “American tradition” in Marxism: the View from
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America (1960).87 According to Rossiter, the American tradition is “consciously pluralistic. Its
unity is the result and process through which unnumbered diversities of faith and intellect seek to
live together in accommodation…[It] is doggedly individualistic… It understands that freedom is
an eternal paradox…”88 It is,
a casual blend of conservatism and liberalism. It is conservative… because it is cautious and
moderate, because it is disposed to preserve what it has inherited, because it puts a high value on
tradition as a social force and prudence as an individual virtue… Yet it is liberal, too… because it
is open-handed and open-minded, because it really expects the future to be better than the past,
because it is interested first of all in the development of free men.89

It is this tradition, he believes, that prevents Marxism from taking hold. People of the
United States are too rational for socialism. And while Marxists are well intentioned, they fall
prey to economic determinism and come to see life only as the product of economics. Only the
U.S. system based on collaboration and individualism can see men for the “robust individuals”
they are and “not just a good member of an economic class.”90 For Rossiter the overarching
ethos of the United States made socialism impossible.
Other scholars of this time looked to more tangible aspects of the U.S. experience for
possible answers, though with the same all-encompassing approach of their colleagues.
Reflecting the postwar economic boom, academics such as economists Charles A. Gulick and
Melvin Bers writing in the journal Industrial Labor Relations Review, reiterated Sombart’s
emphasis on the affluence of the United States as an inhibiting factor:
There is in the American experience one colossal datum which has stood above all the
rest. It has been the fact of a tremendously growing level of material well being yielded
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by the system as a whole… the American wage earner has experienced over a seventyfive year period a rate of economic betterment which has made him labor aristocrat of the
world. 91

According to Gulick and Bers pervasive prosperity not only provided support of the
capitalist system, or at least an apathy to a program of change, but led to the consensus
model of labor relations, where workers acted in what Selig Perlman referred to as a “jobconscious” manner, agreeing to forgo political action in exchange for a seat at the table
with government and business management as economic partners. 92
Historian of the U.S. South David M. Potter added to the discussion by claiming in
People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character (1954), that the United
States had been defined by its sheer immensity of wealth and resources. It is this abundance, he
suggested, that has prevented radical movement:
Essentially, the difference is that Europe has always conceived of redistribution of wealth
as necessitating the expropriation of some and the corresponding aggrandizement of
others; but America has conceived of it primarily in the terms of giving to some without
taking from others. 93

Influenced by the U.S. postwar prosperity, the theory held that in the United States,
unlike Europe, there was enough wealth to go around. This affluence not only prevented class
conflict, according to Potter, but contributed to cooperation in society, as every class in the
United States came to realize that they all could achieve more by working together.
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IV.

While explanations concerning the United States’ lack of socialism continued to focus on
affluence and tangible effects, most scholars did so under a framework of an overarching U.S.
ethos. Some intrepid scholars sought to combine the two. In Social Mobility in Industrial Society
(1959), political scientist Seymour M. Lipset and sociologist Reinhard Bendix discussed both
influences, not only, the level of affluence and social mobility that kept radicalism at bay, they
argued, but a pervasive spirit in the United States that this affluence was attainable. “For as a
matter of fact it is not really clear whether the different political orientation of the American and
European worker reflects different opportunities for social mobility or only a difference in their
ethos!” they stated.94 Lipset and Bendix tried to show that a main part of the ethos of the United
States was the belief in the “American Dream” of social mobility, which encouraged workers to
work within the system to achieve their desire, instead of working to change it.
The common framework of trying to apply an overarching ethos was also used to
examine the peculiarities of the U.S. working class as a possible explanation for the lack of
socialism in the United States. Adolph Sturmthal, the Austrian-American political scientist and
sociologist of labor studies and international relations, started with Hartz’s now commonplace
explanation of the “absence of feudalism” and concluded that U.S. workers were more
independent of the state. In another contribution to the Industrial and Labor Relations Review
(1951), Sturmthal contrasted this with the conditions in Europe, where a tradition of enlightened
absolutism under the monarchies of feudalism, left in place a hierarchical and stratified society.

94

Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society, (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1959), 12.

41
According to Sturmthal, the lower classes under enlightened absolutism became
accustomed to a certain amount of dependence on the state. This “belief in the all-powerful
state,” in turn, led to the “peculiar tendency of European labor to settle by law the problem of
labor relations that American unions traditionally solve by way of collective agreement.”95 U.S.
workers lacked this statist attitude, and engaged in Selig Perlman’s “business unionism” where
they sought out only economic demands and dealt directly with their employers through
contracts and negotiations. European unions, in contrast, worked within the framework of the
state and went through political channels, which led to political organization based on class
factors, and eventually a sizeable socialist movement.96
U.S. labor historian Marc Karson’s American Labor Unions and Politics 1900-1918
(1958) described pervasive middle class individualism and an anti-statist fear of a strong central
government as the “central creed” of U.S. workers:
The American worker feels middle-class and behaves middle-class. To understand his
politics, one must recognize his psychology, a large part of which is middle-class
derived… When Socialists criticize the self-interest and acquisitive spirit of capitalism,
97

the worker feels under attack for within himself, he knows, burns the capitalistic spirit.

Karson attributed the conservatism of U.S. labor unions to Samuel Gompers, the
influential president of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) from 1886 until his death in
1924. Under Gompers’ tutelage the AFL became the United States’ largest and most powerful
labor organization. Though Gompers initially had been sympathetic to socialist politics, noted
Karson, he turned away from class issues towards harmonious cooperation with capitalism and
business unionism.
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The Labor movement under Gompers focused on “pure-and-simple” unionism devoted
mainly to “bread-and-butter” economic issues such as issues of wages, benefits, hours, seniority,
anti-injunction legislation, and working conditions, all of which could be negotiated through
collective bargaining.98 In politics, the Federation sought "political nonpartisanship," or as
Gompers put it, a promise to "elect their friends and defeat their enemies." This meant they
avoided grand reform proposals or direct political action such as the formation of a labor party in
favor of maintaining an independent political agenda and leveraging labor’s mobilization in
exchange for support.99

V.

As Karson explained, Gompers rejected the industrial unionism of the more radical
Knights of Labor, and later the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), which advocated
organizing all workers within an industry regardless of skill or position. Instead, the AFL
remained substantially the domain of skilled, white, native-born, male workers, or the labor
aristocracy. This nativist, labor-segmentation approach prevented repression and by World War
I, Gompers was able to leverage his position for political favors as he was appointed to the to the
Council of National Defense by President Woodrow Wilson. There he helped craft national labor
policy, including explicit government support for independent trade unions and collective
bargaining in exchange for the wartime mobilization of the labor movement. Gompers and the
AFL, as a result, gained clout in national politics and undue influence over the entire labor
movement in the United States up to the 1930s.
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According to Karson, it was, in large part Gompers’s ideological leadership that changed
the face of the AFL, as well as the organized U.S. working class.100 Beyond the influence of
Gompers, however, Karson also attributed the conservative psychology of the workers to the
Roman Catholic faith of the large number of immigrants within its ranks. In a 1951 journal
article for Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Karson argued that the “weakness of
socialism” in the AFL “was, in part, a testimonial to the success of the Catholic Church’s
opposition to the doctrine.” 101
The prolific U.S. social historian Oscar Handlin also attributed socialism’s failure, at
least in part, to Catholicism. In his groundbreaking study, Boston’s Immigrants, 1790-1865: A
Study in Acculturation (1941), Handlin singled out the Irish as especially anti-radical, with
efforts to change the world being viewed from futile to sacrilegious. For Handlin, however, the
argument went backwards.102 It was not religion that made the Irish conservative, but their
former conservative nature that made them religious. And the most important feature
contributing to the overarching conservative ethos of the Irish was their peasant status. In “The
Immigrant and American Politics,” in Foreign Influence in American Life (1944), Handlin
argued that the trauma of transplanting communities to a foreign land isolated and alienated
peasant immigrants:
Perhaps the most prevalent myth about immigrants links them with radicalism, but
nothing could be farther from the truth. The overwhelming majority were exceedingly
conservative in politics, as in other forms of social expression. The peasant origins of
many, and the comparative backwardness of the societies from which they emigrated,
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bred a submissiveness which was not shed in the crossing. In fact the very process of
emigration fosters it. 103

It was this shock of emigration that caused the immigrant of peasant backgrounds to turn inward
to the security of ethnic ties or religion, and reject the call of radicalism.104
Consensus thought is readily apparent in the seminal work, The End of Ideology: On the
Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (1960), by the U.S. sociologist Daniel Bell. Going
beyond a consensus examination of the working class, Bell took the concept of an allencompassing U.S. ethos and applied it to the radical parties themselves. He argued that the
grand ideologies of the nineteenth century were becoming outdated as the United States moved
beyond the need for any ideologies. In this view, ideologically driven individuals or groups such
as socialists were inherently irrational and unreasonable and thus doomed to failure.
Bell suggested that the interplay of competing interests in politics required compromise.
Socialists were incapable of such pragmatism, he declared:
It is my argument that failure of socialist movement in the United States was rooted in its
inability to resolve a basic dilemma of ethics and politics: the socialist movement by the
way in which it stated its goal, and by way in which it rejected the capitalist order as a
whole, could not relate itself to the specific problems of social action in the here and now,
give and take political world. In Sum: it was trapped by the unhappy problem of living in
but not of the world; it could only act, and then inadequately, as the moral, but not
political, man in immoral society.105

Bell asserted that socialists had two choices. They could remain outside of society or they
could join it. From within they could try to influence the system but this would entail sacrificing
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some of their beliefs and lending de facto support to the system while possibly contributing to its
survival by alleviating some of its systemic problems. If they remained on the outside, however,
they could maintain their ideological purity and credibility, but they would all give up any ability
to influence politics and simply act as a philosophical or ethical voice until the system collapsed
on itself. U.S. Socialists, Bell contended, when faced with the problem of “living in but not of
the world,” chose to straddle the line between the two. Yet their ideological rigidity prevented
them from making the necessary sacrifices to succeed.106
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PART THREE: History from the Bottom Up
The New Left’s Search for a Usable Past of U.S. Socialism, 1960s-1970s

The Consensus scholarship was shattered with the social upheaval of the 1960s and
1970s and was challenged by New Left historiography, which was no less influenced by the
interests and needs of its generation. Inspired by the social justice movements of the era, a
number of historians and social scientists increased focus on the lives of the dispossessed. This
desire for a “history from the bottom up” shaped the way scholars answered the Question.
Attention to the lives of rank-and-file workers and to the roots of the racial conflicts of the 1960s
and 1970s led to explanations centering on the racial and ethnic divides within the U.S.
workforce and the emergence of radical parties as a reason for “no socialism” in the United
States.
An equally important development of this era was the search for a “usable past.” Scholars
involved with the social justice movements of the day often sought a history that would
encourage these struggles. This led some New Left academics to assign blame to the internal
problems of the socialist movement. Such an approach not only refuted the “ethos” explanations
of the Consensus era, but suggested that if these problems were fixable, then major social
transformation in the United States was still possible. Other usable explanations focused on
governmental repression, and the absorption of radicalism into mainstream movements, both
contemporary concerns of the New Left. In effect, New Left scholars were simultaneously
asking “Why, Goddammit was there no socialism?” as well as “How can there be Socialism in
the United States?”
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I.

As an example of Consensus scholarship, Bell’s work reacted to the rise of extremist
ideologies in Europe during the 1930 by placing a high price on moderation. Scholars such as
Hartz, Boorstin, or Rossiter viewed U.S. capitalism as, if not desirable, then at least inevitable.
And after experiencing the public unity that emerged during World War II and found a new
common enemy in the Cold War, these academics often portrayed U.S. history as one of
harmony and agreement in regard to matters of political economy.
Despite the dominance of the Consensus paradigm, however, several social conflicts
threatened to unravel not only the academy, but society as a whole. By the 1960s the nascent
African-American civil rights movement soon garnered national attention by confronting the
system of racial segregation in the U.S. South. U.S foreign policy saw the escalation of the war
in Vietnam, which, to its critics, represented not the fair and just United States of the Consensus
School, but rather an imperial venture designed to preserve capitalism. And as the casualties
grew, so too did an anti-war movement swollen by the hoards of young people born in the boom
following World War II now coming of age. Out of this new generation emerged a renewed zeal
for social justice issues and a counterculture that revolutionized social and cultural norms about
clothing, music, drugs, dress, formalities, and schooling.
The Consensus School could not explain the anomalies of poverty, racism, militarism,
social disruption and violence that dominated public discourse by the Sixties. A framework
emphasizing cooperation and unity increasingly seemed out of touch in the face of such blatant
contradictions, and several scholars began to turn on its established wisdom. John Higham, the
U.S. historian of home-grown nativism, was the first to name and criticize Consensus School in
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the article for Commentary, “The Cult of the ‘American Consensus’: Homogenizing Our History
(1959),” for seeking to “show us a single homogenized culture,” by carrying out “a massive
grading operation to smooth over America’s social convulsions.”107 In his influential article in
America Historical Review, “Beyond Consensus: The Historian as a Moral Critic’ (1959),
Higham called for a return to moral engagement.108
One of the earliest and most influential scholars to shift away from the Consensus
framework was William Appleman Williams. Williams’ rereading of U.S. diplomatic history
helped set the tone for a general reinterpretation for the next generation of scholars. In The
Tragedy of American Diplomacy (1959), Williams challenged conventional interpretations on
The United States’ rise to world power status by claiming that U.S foreign policy was motivated
by underlying expansionist tendencies rooted in an imperialist or “Open Door” policy. Williams
turned the standard consensus interpretation of the Cold War around, blaming the United States,
in part, for provoking a conflict with the Soviet Union.109
As a sharp departure from the consensus model these radical interpretations shook
conventional wisdom. Williams used the analytical tools of Niebuhr and turned them against the
elites. Taking the consensus idea of pluralist powers balancing each other out, Williams put a
spin on it and suggested it was actually a strategy of corporate interests seeking to stabilize
capitalism through a collaboration between business, government, and labor. In this view, elites
would make concessions that would ensure a long-term benefit of lowered class conflict through
cooperation from the government. By inspiring a paradigm shift throughout the U.S. academy,
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Williams became known as the “grand old man” of what would be called New Left”
scholarship.110
Under the New Left paradigm, the perennial question of why there is no socialism in the
United States took on new significance. Accordingly, New Left scholars immediately went to
work to dismantle the Hartzian/consensus interpretation. The British sociologist Tom Bottomore,
for example, asserted in his essay, “Comment on The Relevance of Marxism,” that the problem
with the consensus explanation lied in its “notion of a single American ‘tradition,’ particularly in
its conceptions of American democracy as the final attainment of the ‘good society,’ and the
fundamental unchangeability of American institutions.”111
Beyond this, New Left scholars attacked the Hartzian/consensus explanation for its lack
of conflict. As U.S. social historian Eric Foner wrote,
The notion of an overarching liberal consensus went far toward understanding the context
within which Hartz wrote – America of the 1950’s – but has proved of little value in
explaining the strength of challenges to the capitalist order ranging from the class
violence of 1877 to the Knights of Labor, Populism, and the old Socialist Party.112

As turmoil racked society, conflict came to the forefront of social sciences once again,
and the consensus explanation that was based on the denying of any major upheavals throughout
U.S. history had to be disregarded.
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II.

Another critique of Consensus targeted an overarching U.S. ethos incompatible with the
view that the United States was made of a multitude of diverse elements. Mirroring changing
social beliefs about equity, a dominant feature of New Left scholarship was the belief that
ordinary people possessed both the ability and the right to make decision for themselves.113
Suddenly the oppressed, the poor, and the exploited became central to many new studies as a
“new social” history replaced the focus on the activities or ideas of elites. An interest in the
diverse identities and historical experience of subordinate groups and a critical view of power
structures led to a tendency toward what U.S. radical historian Jessie Lemisch, called “history
from the bottom up.”114
A new generation of scholars now promoted the study of ordinary people throughout the
past who often left no written record requiring new techniques. Some social historians began to
use census data and evidence to try to extrapolate details from the populations of the past. The
first major work to utilize these methods had been The Making of an American Community: A
Case Study of Democracy in a Frontier County (1956), by the U.S. Progressive historian Merle
Curti.115 His use of statistics and social science methodologies to systematically examine the
social mobility of entire population of a frontier county set it apart from the older social history
and helped establish the methodology for the new “Quantitative History” that would become
central to many new social schools of historical analysis.116
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Quantitative history was soon used as a new tool in the arsenal of academics to address
the topic of radicalism in the United States. U.S. historian Stephan Thernstrum adopted
quantitative methods to test the assumption of many Consensus academics regarding the high
levels of mobility of the United States. Going back to Marx and Sombart, commentators had
asserted that high comparative levels of social mobility were major contributors to the lack of
U.S. socialism. However, this theory rested entirely on conjecture and assumptions regarding the
level of affluence of U.S. society, until Thernstrum put it to the test.
Examining the working-class city of Newburyport, Massachusetts for the years 1850 to
1880 and Boston from 1880 to 1963, Thernstrum, in his book Poverty and Progress: Social
Mobility in a Nineteenth Century City (1964), concluded that the United States did have high
levels of mobility when compared to the city of Marseilles in France. He also found that U.S.
workers were likely to leave their place of birth, earn more money progressively over the course
of their lives, earn more than their fathers, and enter into the property owning class. Yet
homeownership required a severe limit on family spending and employment of the entire family.
Those who did manage to attain the marker of “middle-class” success, did so often at the cost of
their family’s comfort, putting women and children to work and requiring a level of austerity
bordering on “ruthless under consumption.”117 Other scholars using the new methods of
quantitative history, such as Tom Rishøj, published in the interdisciplinary journal on
methodology Quality and Quantity, found that European cities such as Copenhagen had
comparable rates of mobility to many U.S. Cities, if not higher rates.118
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Another new field that emerged in the 1970s was “ethnic studies”. Inspired by the racial
tensions of 1960s, ethnic studies used the concept of history from the bottom up to bring
attention to the diverse makeup of U.S. society. Scholars such as Iring Fetscher, the German
political scientist, used this new field to help explain the United States’ unique ethnic mix.
Fetscher argued that previous scholarship had failed to appreciate the rich diversity of U.S.
society. Their model, he argued,
treats the American working class as a single unity. But in fact this has never been the
case, and in the U.S.A. less so than in any other capitalist country. Not only does [it] not
mention the Negro, but [it] overlooks the importance of the constant inflow of
immigrants and the marked distinction between immigrants from the different part of
Europe and Asia.119

Immigration and diversity, according to Fetscher, disproved the idea of a homogenous
U.S. ethos, and therefore the Hartzian/consensus interpretation. Yet it also has been the same
factor that that impeded the growth of socialism in the United States, he suggested, because it
discouraged “the creation of a genuine sense of class consciousness and class solidarity” among
a proletariat too heterogeneous to unite around class issues.120
Investigating racial and ethnic conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s, Mike Davis, the writer,
activist and historian, constructed a theory in his article “Why the U.S. Working Class is
Different (1980),” in the New Left Review, in which diversity affected class consciousness in a
different way. According to Davis, immigrant groups often formed complex ethnic and social
networks that intended to forge cross class alliances based on shared ethnicity. These networks
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diminished the strength of unions and class-based political parties, which sought to diminish
ethnic loyalties and accentuate class.121
Sociologist Gerald Rosenblum, in Immigrant Workers: Their Impact of American Labor
Radicalism (1973), used ethnic studies to help explain U.S. radicalism by focusing on the “new
immigrants” that came to the United States during the intense period of immigration and
industrialization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century from Southern, Central and
Eastern Europe. But rather than immigrants, Rosenblum argued, these workers should be viewed
as more akin to migrant laborers, or “sojourners,” “insofar as their goals were short-term,
narrowly economic, and oriented toward ultimate return to their home society.” Rosenblum
pointed out that in 1910 three-quarters as many Italians migrants left the United States as arrived,
making the Irish and the Jews the mainstay of organized labor in this period because these
newcomers could not return home. The focus of the rest of the immigrants on economic gains, he
explained, helped buttress the “business unionism” of the U.S. labor movement and diminished
its radical potential.122
The ethnic focus inspired by the New Left also looked into the divisions between the new
immigrant communities and “old immigrants” who consisted primarily of the Irish and Northern
and Western Europeans. Iring Fetscher pointed out how in an attempt to differentiate themselves
from the new undesirables, the old immigrants often excluded the “newcomers” from spheres
where they were already established:
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The newcomers were not allowed to play a leading part in politics and as soon as they had
become ‘citizens,’ they tended to distinguish themselves as much as they could from the next
generation of newcomers ‘below them,’ as well as from the Establishment above.123

In addition to the inter-generational divisions of immigrants, Sociologist Charles
Leinenweber’s “The American Socialist Party and ‘New’ Immigrants (1968),” in Science and
Society, made the point that an even greater rift stemming from immigration accounts for the
failure of socialism in the United States. Nativism, or the opposition to immigration from the
U.S. working class and the Socialist Party, he suggested, was to blame for socialism’s failure
“motivated by nativism and racism,” Leinenweber asserted that the Socialist Party “kept these
immigrant socialists adrift, failing to integrate them,” as the party’s “municipal” wing, sought
electoral victories in cities and broad acceptance as a progressive reform party. 124
To gain acceptance, the Socialist Party aligned itself with the conservative AFL, whose
opposition to immigration stemmed from the desire to curb cheap labor, a threat to the economic
prospects of skilled workers. This anti-immigration stance was approved over the protests of the
“industrial,” or more radical left wing of the party primarily concerned with ideological purity
and revolutionary potential. Leinenweber avowed that “so long as the party was controlled by the
right wing, it was incapable of molding a socialist army out of the new immigrants.” Because the
U.S. socialist movement failed to properly court the immigrant population, it could never
establish a sizeable party he concluded. 125
Economists Michael Reich, David M. Gordon and Richard C. Edwards also viewed the
ethnic segmentation of workforce in the United States as an impediment to class consciousness
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and action. Their report published in the American Economic Review, showed how the division
between native-born skilled workers and unskilled immigrant laborers discouraged radical unity:
Labor market segmentation arose and is perpetuated because… it helps reproduce
capitalist hegemony. Firs… segmentation divides workers and forestalls potential
movements uniting all workers against employers. Second, segmentation establishes "fire
trails" across vertical job ladders and, to the extent that workers perceive separate
segments with different criteria for access, workers limit their own aspirations for
mobility. Less pressure is then placed on other social institutions- the schools and the
family, for example- that reproduce the class structure. Third, division of workers into
segments legitimizes inequalities in authority and control between superiors and
subordinates. 126

According to the report, this segmentation is the deliberate outcome of the concerted effort of the
capitalist class to forestall radicalism among workers in the United States.

III.

Despite such conclusions, not all ethnic studies scholars agreed that immigration and
diversity curbed radicalism. Victor Greene argued in The Slavic Community on Strike:
Immigrant Labor in Pennsylvania Anthracite (1968) that the presence of immigrant workers in
United Mine Workers (UNW) strikes in the Pennsylvania anthracite coal region in the 1880s
increased the militancy of the strikers. Immigrants were “…more tenacious in their hold upon
their right to organize even more than the Americans,” concluded Greene. The practice of
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organizing worker councils around ethnic lines, he suggested, tapped into ethnic community
structures already in place and helped to strengthened union cohesion.127
More positive assessments of the ties between ethnicity and radicalism stemmed from
practitioners of “New Labor” studies, a genre inspired by the seminal work of British social
historian E.P. Thompson’s The Making of the English Class (1964)128. Thompson, an avowedly
partisan Marxist, focused on the experiences of actual workers instead of the traditional method
of studying the hierarchies of trade unions, the development of markets, or political philosophies.
It is no surprise, then, that many New Labor scholars assumed a critical stance when it came to
traditional labor elites. Jeremy Brecher, a U.S. historian of social movements, went as far as to
blame their mismanagement for the failure of socialism in the United States. In his book Strike!
(1972), Brecher examined the country’s largest walkouts ranging from the Great Railroad Strike
of 1877, in which federal troops had to be called in against waves of spontaneous violence, to the
Strike Wave of 1946, the postwar labor actions that were the largest in U.S. History. Brecher
concluded that rank-and-file workers were much more militant than often given credit, and that it
was the organization and the leadership that dampened their revolutionary zeal.129
Here Brecher turned both Lenin and Perlman on their heads. Instead of a conservative
working class radicalized by intellectuals and leaders, it was the leaders that lagged behind the
rank and file. And though Brecher’s argument might seem similar to Marc Karson’s in that they
both emphasized the leadership of the labor movement, Karson’s focus on Gompers arose from
the consensus school’s fixation on powerful individuals while Brecher’s approach derived from a
contemporary distrust of institutions and hierarchies.
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Several New Left scholars sought to create a history that provided models of success and
inspiration by constructing a “usable past.” Charles Leinenweber, reflecting on his own work in
1984,
The American Socialist Party and “New” Immigrants written early in 1967 in Berkley,
California, during the building of the antiwar and black power movements. On the one
hand, it was intended as a contribution to the ongoing debate “why no socialism in
America?” On the other, it was intended to address implicitly the practical matter of
creating a new socialist movement.130

Activist historian Staughton Lynd also pointed out the importance of creating a usable past in
addressing the question of “why is there no socialism in the United States?” “We must ask it not
as detached spectators,” Lynd demanded,
but as men and women who will attempt to act out an answer. We must ask, not: Why is
there still no socialist movement in the United States?, but: Can a socialist movement in
the United States be built?...We will not know whether socialism in America is possible
until, once more, we try.131

An increasingly appealing topic for New Left scholars, in this context, became the
actions of the radical parties themselves. If the previous failures of radical movements were due
to the mistakes of individuals, tactics, beliefs, or policies, then the modern movements could
learn how to avoid those mistakes. On the other hand, if there was something inherent in U.S.
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culture and society that prevented radicalism, then modern day movements stood very little
chance of success, no matter what they did.132
The most popular manifestation of the “internal” approach to the failure of socialism in
the United States was directed at the leadership of the radical parties. Radical historian Paul
Buhle maintained in an essay on Debsian Socialism and the ‘New Immigrant’ worker, in 1973
that it was not the working class, nor the labor elite, but the socialist leadership that was too
conservative. During the first two decades of the twentieth century, he pointed out, the Socialist
Party had made great inroads in the nation’s political scene, especially in local elections. In 1912
Socialists were elected to over 1200 local offices, thirty-three state legislative positions, and a
number of leadership posts in municipal governments. However, according to Buhle, the Party’s
obsession with electoral victories meant it failed to respond to the massive labor upheavals of the
day. Inspired in part by nativism, it focused instead on native-born small farmers, skilled
workers, and professionals and intellectuals instead of the factory workers and unskilled laborers
essential to a successful movement.133
Historian of U.S. labor and social movements, John Laslett, while denouncing Daniel
Bell in a commentary in 1974, also argued that U.S. Socialists lacked a proper level of radicalism
to succeed. This was especially so in the 1930s, Laslett suggested, when the “rightward drift” of
the Socialist Party “made it so reformist as to abandon all serious attempts at socialism,” making
it “virtually indistinguishable from the Democrats.”134 These explanations not only served to free
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U.S. history from a consensual ethos, but also served as a rallying cry for more radicalism in the
contemporary movement.
James Weinstein, the socialist historian and journalist, came to a different conclusion. As
Weinstein argued in The Decline of Socialism in America, 1912-1925 (1967), the Socialist Party
from 1900 to 1919 had not mistakenly aimed its focus on electoral victories but in fact succeeded
at becoming a successful reform party. Unlike many scholars, Weinstein maintained that the
Party’s decline did not happen before or even during World War II, but after the impact of the
Russian Revolution. Similar to Daniel Bell, Weinstein contended that the faction of the party
allied to the Comintern succumbed to ideological rigidity and tried to impose a strict Soviet–style
ideology upon the rest of the Old Left. What had been a broad popular movement, according to
Weinstein, fell victim to factionalism and infighting, a lesson the author hoped to apply to the
contemporary movement.135
Sociologist and labor-historian, Melvyn Dubofsky’s book We Shall Be All: A History of
the Industrial Workers of the World (1969), looked at the IWW to examine the level of
radicalism in the U.S. labor movement. The IWW was a mass-based union founded in 1905 as a
radical alternative to the conservative AFL. IWW members, or Wobblies as they were known,
advocated revolutionary socialism, workplace democracy and industrial unionism, where all
workers in the same industry are organized into the same union, unlike the craft unionism of the
AFL which only included skilled, white laborers. The IWW extended membership to all
wageworkers regardless of race, creed, color or sex, and engaged in direct action resistance, even
occasional sabotage, quickly earning it a widespread reputation, either romanticized or
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demonized. For these reasons the IWW served as the perfect topic of a usable past, as Dubofsky
explained:
Although the IWW ultimately failed to achieve its major objectives, it nevertheless
bequeathed Americans an invaluable legacy. Those young Americans who practice direct
action, passive resistance, and civil disobedience, and who seek an authentic “radical
tradition,” should find much to ponder in the Wobblies past. Those who distrust
establishment politics, deride bureaucracies, favor community action, and preach
“participatory democracy” would also do well to remember the history of the IWW.
Indeed, all who prefer a society based upon community to one founded on coercion
cannot afford to neglect the tragic history of the IWW.136

As an all-inclusive, decentralized, and radical movement, the IWW appeared as a much
better role model for current struggles than the conservative and bureaucratic Socialist Party or
mainstream labor unions. However, according to Dubofsky, it was this radicalism that spelled
defeat for the Wobblies. Pointing to the inherent difficulties in revolutionary movements, and the
impossible balance between reform and rebellion, Dubofsky noted that the IWW needed to show
its workers tangible results to justify their allegiance. Yet if the IWW allowed workers to fight
for immediate improvements, the possibility was that they could win, “a result which, if
achieved, inevitably diminished their discontent and hence their revolutionary potential.”137
Recognition of this dilemma led to the union’s refusal to sign contracts with employers,
believing that such agreements limited workers' ability to strike, and that it would then place the
union in the position of enforcing capitalist demands upon its workers. As Dubofsky
acknowledged,
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Employers constantly used the IWW’s no-contract principle to rationalize their own
resistance to any form of collective bargaining. If the IWW could not negotiate with
employers, how could it raise wages or improve working conditions? On the other hand,
if the IWW did sanction contracts, win recognition, and improve its members’ lives, what
would keep them from forsaking revolutionary goals and adhering to the well-established
AFL pattern? If the IWW began to declare truces in the class war, how could it bring
about the ultimate revolution? In the end, IWW leaders usually subordinated reform
opportunities to revolutionary necessities, while the rank and file, when it could, took
reform and neglected the revolution.138

Strangely reminiscent of Daniel Bell’s theory, Dubofsky pictured the Wobblies as straddling the
line between being of the world and in the world, a balance they ultimately failed to sustain.

IV

Another New Left explanation for the failure of radicalism in the United States was
outright repression. “Violence and bloodshed did follow Wobblies wherever they fought for free
speech or higher wages,” claimed Dubofsky.139 Historian and civil libertarian William Preston
Jr.’s Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals 1903-1933 (1963), also highlights
repression as a central factor curbing U.S. radicalism, specifically in reference to the IWW and
the events surrounding the First World War. As the United States entered the European war in
1917, moderate unions were rewarded for cooperation. For example, Gompers of the AFL saw
the war as an opportunity to gain respectability and achieve employer concessions such as the
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eight-hour workday, 20 percent wage increases, welfare pensions, the formation of personnel
departments, and union recognition. 140
The IWW, in contrast, maintained its dedication to radical social change at a cost. As one
of the only labor organizations to publically oppose the war, the union bore the brunt of wartime
measures to suppress dissent. Preston writes:
In the wartime hysteria of 1917, Americans were in no mood to accept reasonable
interpretations of the inflammatory and incendiary prose by which the IWW had lived....
By emphasizing the continuing war with the master class and by refusing to abandon the
right to strike, the IWW retained the very concepts that were to ensure its suppression.141

Accordingly, President Woodrow Wilson sent federal troops to break up IWW strikes in
Washington State and Montana and the Wobbly leadership was decimated when over 165 of its
leaders faced federal prosecution under the Espionage Act of 1917. The Sedition Act of 1918,
moreover, made it a crime to write, publish or even talk about the armed forces, flag, constitution
or government in a negative way. Legal repression also encouraged vigilantes to attack or kill
scores of Wobblies with impunity.142
The end of the war brought no reprise as what would become known as the First Red
Scare ushered in a period of widespread fear of and repression towards communists, anarchists,
immigrants, and radicalism in general. Spurred by increased labor unrest and fears of the Russian
Bolshevik Revolution spreading to shores of the United States, some communities banned books
and required loyalty oaths from teachers, while twenty-eight states enacted anti-sedition laws.
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Thousands of radicals and immigrants were arrested or deported, or even killed between 1919
and 1920 and the IWW was, for all intents and purposes, destroyed.143
Historian Gabriel Kolko also points to government repression as a cause of the failure the
American Socialist Party in the article “The Decline of American Radicalism in the Twentieth
Century (1966),” for Studies on the Left. Following WWI, “at the very moment American
socialism appeared on the verge of significant organization and success,” wrote Kolko, “it was
attacked by the combined resources of the Federal and various state governments.”144 During the
war over one-third of the Party’s ranks had faced arrest. Eugene V. Debs. Debs, the outspoken
labor leader and perennial Socialist candidate for president, had to run his fifth national
campaign from inside a federal prison, after publicly denouncing the war and facing prosecution
under the Espionage Act. After the war the government suppression of Socialists continued, even
resulting in the expulsion of five democratically elected Socialist members of the New York
Assembly in 1920.
James R. Green, Professor of History and Labor Studies, argued in Grass-Roots
Socialism: Radical Movements in the Southwest 1895-1943 (1978) that despite initial success,
the repression of the socialist parties of the U.S. West and Midwest was a chief cause of their
decline:
The unsuccessful efforts made by… other groups to oppose the draft led to widespread
repression of the Socialist party and the IWW… And these abortive direct actions
hastened the repression of the entire left in the Southwest…government officials
possessed the legal authority to suppress radicalism. They used this authority quite
effectively in 1917 and 1918 to destroy the Socialist movement throughout the West and
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Midwest… The passage of criminal syndicalism laws and the raids connected with the
1919 Red Scare wiped out the last pockets of radical resistance…145

Green’s point that the government repression of World War I radicals used “patriotism as a
pretext” had particular relevance for New Left scholars who identified with anti-war protest
during the height of the Vietnam War.
British author and historian, David Caute, expanded this argument to include the
repression of radicals during the 1950s. During the Second Red Scare the FBI processed more
than five million loyalty oaths and Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin and the House UnAmerican Activities Committee (HUAC) initiated congressional hearings on possible communist
infiltration of society. Dissidents, moreover, could face federal prosecution under
The Alien Registration Act of 1940 (aka the Smith Act) or The Internal Security Act of 1950
(aka the McCarran Act), which outlawed any organization advocating the violent overthrow of
the State, and put limitations on the rights Communists, effectively outlawing the CPSUA. By
the end of the decade, thousands of suspected radicals had been wiretapped, surveilled,
interrogated, blackmailed, indicted, or imprisoned.146
Claiming that government suppression prevented socialism not only freed New Left
scholars from the burden of an all-encompassing, inhospitable U.S. ethos, but took the blame off
activists themselves. In this scenario radicals in the United States simply faced an adversary
more powerful than they were. This explanation also had the added bonus of highlighting the
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historical injustices of the U.S. federal government, a tactic that helped activist scholars
demonstrate parallels to modern struggles in the effort to garner support.
Historian John Laslett has acknowledged the importance of the “long history of
repressive acts undertaken against radicals and Marxists” in curbing U.S. socialism but points to
the contradiction that other countries with sizeable labor movements have experienced as much
repression, if not more. In the United States, notes Laslett, “repression of radical movements has
not taken the form of deliberate murder or destruction as often as it has in a number of European
countries.” Yet Laslett reconciles this observation with the proposal that the U.S. socialist
movement was more susceptible to repression than European counterparts because of larger
societal forces:
I would suggest that part of the explanation is to be found in the fact that where you have
a highly stratified society in which crucial elements of either the peasantry or the
proletariat are already predisposed against constituted authority and at a time of crisis are
willing to follow class leaders or otherwise to act in a class way, then repression simply
drives the movement underground, from where it will reemerge, strengthened, at a
suitable moment. On the other hand, if you have a society in which either the agrarian
element or the urban working class lacks any coherent sense of class loyalty and is
predisposed toward acculturation or assimilation, as in the United States, then repression
will have the opposite effect. Instead of nourishing rebellion, in other words, it will
induce its followers to draw back from any fundamental challenge to the society, and to
accept their pace instead in what may continue to be an unjust social system. 147
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V.

While repression made for an appealing excuse for the failure of socialism in the United
States, scholars like Laslett did not lay the entirety of the blame on that issue alone. An even
greater factor pointed out by Melvyn Dubofsky was the ability of U.S. corporate managers and
the political system to absorb radicalism. Referring to the IWW, Dubofsky suggested the
following:
Unlike radicals in other societies who contended with established orders unresponsive to
lower-class discontent and impervious to change from within, the Wobblies struggled
against flexible and sophisticated adversaries… Whatever success the Wobblies achieved
only stimulated the reform process, for employers who were threatened by the IWW paid
greater attention to labor relations, and government agencies, initially called upon to
repress labor strife, encouraged employers to improve working conditions. While IWW
leaders felt repression during World War I, their followers enjoyed eight-hour days,
grievance boards, and company unions. Put more simply, reform finally proved a better
method than repression for weakening the IWW’s appeal to workers.148

Much like socialist politician Morris Hillquit who suggested the same theory a halfcentury earlier, many New Left scholars saw great efficacy in this proposition. As activists
struggled to reform society in the 1960s and 1970s, they too faced what they saw as “flexible and
sophisticated adversaries,” in a democratic establishment that practiced the art of co-optation.
First, the goal of racial justice had been addressed by President Lyndon Johnson is the landmark
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965. Next, class issues became a concern of
the administration through the set of domestic programs designed to alleviate poverty and
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promote a social welfare safety net known as the Great Society, through Medicare Medicaid and
aid to cities, college students and pubic schooling. Even the Vietnam War, which had been
central to the foreign policy of the Democrats, was coopted by the time Senator George
McGovern ran as a “peace” candidate for President in 1972, before Richard Nixon arranged a
withdrawal of all combat troops from the war months later.
In similar fashion, John Laslett attributed the Socialist Party’s decline in large part to the
loss of union support triggered by Wilsonian progressive reforms between 1913 and 1916:
Once President Wilson had been elected, and had begun to enact the series of social
reforms for which his first administration became famous (the Clayton Act, the La
Follette Seamen’s Act, the establishment of a Department of Labor, and so on), virtually
all of the unions considered in this sample began immediately to turn away from their
earlier political support of the Socialist party, and to align themselves with the
Democrats.149

Mike Davis pursued a similar line of reasoning, but put the foci in a later period by
asserting that President Franklin Roosevelt neutralized labor and radicalism. Davis argued that
the ‘leftward’ turn of the New Deal in 1935 through measures such as the Social Security Act,
the Works Progress Administration, and the Wagner National Labor Relations Act “stole the
thunder and coopted the popular raison d’être of the insurgent political movements.” This was
particularly true of Roosevelt’s treatment of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). The
CIO, a spin-off from the AFL, was much more progressive in that it organized regardless of craft
or race but much less radical than previous industrial unions like the IWW. Although the CIO
did not advocate revolution it practiced social unionism, which advocated that workers were
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patriotic consumers and what was good for them was good for everyone. The union’s agenda
included higher wages, seniority rights, grievance procedures, civil rights, health insurance, and
full employment but accepted the basic capitalist structure of the economy.150
By supporting the CIO, Roosevelt gained the support of labor. Davis explains that
contrary to the strikebreaking of President Grover Cleveland and Wilson, Roosevelt’s tacit
support for the CIO’s sit-down strike in 1936–37 “allowed him to appear as the saviour of
industrial unionism.” However, Davis also claims that the “shrewdness of Roosevelt’s strategy”
not only attained labor’s support, but that “the broad reforms” of FDR’s “Second New Deal”
constituted a “powerful gravitational force which attracted contemporary radicalism much closer
to the orbit of the Democratic Party.” By 1940, 10 percent to one-fourth of the CIO’s leadership
were Communist activists. Roosevelt managed to funnel would-be radicals into the more
acceptable CIO and the New Deal Coalition, cutting the strength out from under a broad class
based movement.151
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PART FOUR: The End of History and the End of Exceptionalism
Cultural Studies, Neoconservatives and Socialism’s Plight, 1970s-2000s

As New Left historiography peaked with the end of the Vietnam War in 1973, a New
Social History was increasingly focused on culture. Combining the New Left’s attention to
ordinary people with the Consensus school’s desire for an overarching ethos, the “Cultural Turn”
led to examinations of institutions and systems and how they influence the way people construct
their identities and make sense of their world. Such an approach has implications for studying the
degree of radicalism in the United States. “Why can’t there be socialism in the United States?”
some scholars asked.
At the same time the country was experiencing a backlash against the remnants of the
New Left. This rightward shift changed the nation politically as well as academically.
Mainstream scholarship on the alleged failures of radicalism took an increasingly congratulatory
tone, citing the success of capitalism as the most prevalent reason for the collapse of socialism.
The end of the Cold War and a period of relative stability and prosperity in the early 1990s led
Neoconservative scholars to proudly declare the end of history and a restatement of American
Exceptionalism. “There can be no socialism in the United States!” they seemed to say.

I.

An important legacy of New Left scholarship conveyed disenchantment with the U.S.
political system, and the belief that real progress was impossible through the established order.
This led to an examination of whether the nature of the political system in the United States was
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particularly inhospitable to radicalism. Such disillusionment, however, proceeded beyond
politics to new fields of academia that questioned the very concepts of rationality in human
affairs and the efficacy of political programs. Much of this scholarship emerged in response to
the white backlash against forced busing, open housing, and urban disorder in the form of inner
city race riots that emerged during the later stages of the Great Society. For its opponents like
George Wallace, the Alabama Governor and pro-segregation presidential hopeful, and Ronald
Reagan, the Republican, anti-radical governor of California who would be elected president in
1980, civil rights legislation seemed to be an overextension of government power favoring
blacks at the expense of whites. This aversion to the welfare state, defense of limited
government, opposition to the civil rights agenda, and animosity to the counterculture and
militant blacks began to erode the once strong New Deal Coalition of the Democratic Party.
As the public turned against both liberalism and radicalism, so did much of the working
class the New Left was seeking to emancipate. The youth-oriented antiwar movement was
garnered resentment for its disruptions and disrespect for authority, particularly when many
activists came from elite universities and were exempt from the draft. There were even examples
of violent reprisals, like the “Hard Hat Riot” of 1970, where two-hundred construction workers
mobilized by the AFL-CIO attacked a group of college protesters in Lower Manhattan, resulting
in seventy injuries and six arrests. Many in the U.S. working class saw the elites in Washington
D.C., on college campuses, and in the media as looking down their noses at ordinary people. And
when the Vietnam War finally did end with the Nixon administrations withdrawal of combat
forces in 1973, the activist New Left lost the major issue that had united its disparate forces.
With the collapse of New Left hopes, its supporters in academia abandoned their quest
for a usable past. In 1979, New Left Sociologist Charles Leinenweber, reflecting back on his
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earlier work, acknowledged, “the practical aspect is less interesting to us now, since the
movements of the 1960s have long subsided and no new ones have arisen to take their place.”152
At the same time, New Left’s focus on “history from the bottom up” had inspired an
outpouring of scholarship on slavery and other issues that emphasized the role of AfricanAmerican agency.153 The proliferation of scholarship on Black History, combined with the
formation of Black or African-American Studies, offered fresh perspectives on the failure of
socialism in the United States. Sally Miller, a professor of social sciences, argued in the Journal
of Negro History in 1971 that the Socialist Party “undertook no meaningful struggle against
second-class citizenship,” and this helped to explain its failure. The Socialist focus on class
consciousness, contended Miller, often ignored other factors such as race:
The Negro might be noticed by the part in his economic role as a worker, but he was not
seen to be a worker with peculiar difficulties imposed by the existing semi-caste system.
Marxist ideology, instead of leading Socialists to seek out the Negro as the worker with
absolutely nothing to lose but his chains, reinforced the existing national tendency to
overlook his comprehensive exploitation.154

Even if the Socialist Party had reached out to the African-American community, Miller
insisted, it was “unlikely that a fruitful relationship would have evolved.” Despite the existence
of Black socialist leaders like A. Philip Randolph and Chandler Owen, the majority of the black
community “demonstrated very little interest in the abolition of capitalism. What he wanted was
his opportunity to prosper within that system.”155
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Another academic shift in the 1970s and 1980s that influenced the way scholars
addressed the absence of U.S. socialism involved the increased attention paid to the lives of
women. Women’s Studies arose from both the New Left legacy of emphasizing the experience
of ordinary people and the resurgence of a strong women’s rights movement in the United States
in the 1970s addressed reproductive rights, domestic violence, sexual harassment, sexual
violence, and economic, political, and social discrimination. Works such as Sheila Rothman’s
Woman’s Proper Place: A History of Changing Ideals and Practices, 1870 to the Present (1978),
and Mary Beth Norton’s Liberty’s Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience of American
Women, 1750-1800 (1980), tried to focus on the experiences of ordinary women, as opposed to
only focusing on the "Great Women," of the past.156
Like African American Studies, Women Studies breathed fresh air into the study of U.S.
socialism. Sally Miller, for example, argued that another important factor that contributed to the
downfall of the Socialist Party was its failure in fully harnessing the potential power of women.
Miller pointed out how there were numerous instances of overlap between women’s rights
issues, such as literacy, temperance, women’s labor and suffrage, and the Socialist program. And
unlike the dominant political parties, she noted, the Socialists had a relatively large female
contingent that made up over a tenth of the party’s membership and played a large role in its
abilities:
Women served the party as organizers, propagandists, pamphleteers, and candidates for
public office. In 1912, the party sent sixty speakers throughout North America on a
lyceum circuit, and over one-fifth of these were women. Party journalists were women
almost as often as men, with copy editors and staff people tending to be women.
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Autonomous women’s socialist study groups… coordinated their programs and their
lobbying around party initiatives. Women party members raised funds for strike benefits
and campaign expenses, distributed propaganda, served as poll watchers, established and
taught socialist Sunday schools and in general, built bridges to nonsocialist women and
women’s organizations. 157

Despite such involvement, Miller argued, the political leadership of the Socialist party,
dominated by patriarchal white men, insisted on keeping the struggle for women’s rights separate
and the women’s groups detached and subordinate to the national organization. “Party treatment
of the so-called Woman Question and of women members often seemed perfunctory, more lip
service than genuine commitment,” she noted.158 In the end, she concludes, the socialist
movement suffered from such exclusion.

II.

While social history thrived in the new subfields of women’s and African-American
studies, the topic of culture emerged as a major area of scholarly focus. The “cultural turn” was
inspired by works like Hayden White’s Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in NineteenthCentury Europe (1973), Clifford Geertz’s The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays
(1973), Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of Prison (1977), and Pierre
Bourdieu’s Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977).159 The new interdisciplinary field of Cultural
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Studies drew its inspiration from the concepts of cultural anthropology, post-structuralism, and
linguistic analysis to examine the way humans explain and assign meaning to their experiences
in the world through cultural constructs, such as language or systems of representation.160
Cultural studies insists that culture must be viewed within the social relations and system through
which it is produced and consumed, and is intimately bound up with the assessment of society,
politics, and economics. U.S. culture and society, in other words, is a contested terrain with
various groups and ideologies struggling for control.161
U.S. scholars such as sociologists Charles Leinenweber, John Alt, Stanley Aronowitz,
and historian Lawrence Goodwyn applied this new emphasis on culture to their understanding of
U.S. radicalism and its shortcomings using the concepts of Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci was an
Italian writer, politician, political theorist, philosopher, sociologist, linguist, and founding
member of the Italian Communist Party in the interwar period until his imprisonment by Benito
Mussolini’s Fascist regime. After his death, his work gained prestige by moving Marxism
beyond economic issues with his concept of cultural hegemony, which describes how the ruling
class uses cultural norms and ideology to maintain power in capitalist societies.162 Borrowing
this notion, John Alt, a scholar of sociology and anthropology, outlined a framework of “Liberal
hegemony,” in his article for the journal Telos, “Beyond Class: The Decline of Industrial Labor
and Leisure (1973),” in which the the working class is transformed into the consuming class and
neutered its revolutionary potential
One of the great social and cultural transformations of the twentieth century is the
historical shift from the primacy of labor to that of consumption—the mediation of social
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relations and consciousness by consumer goods. This relatively recent phenomenon
eclipses the class experience of wage-labor and raises commodity fetishism to a new
form of domination: from extensive exploitation and misery (wage-labor), to reduced
work time (leisure) and increased material comforts (consumerism). Integrated by
increased leisure and higher wages, modern employees are culturally and politically
dislodged from the world of work and from a class experience in the traditional Marxian
sense. Concerned primarily with the immediate gratifications of familial intimacy and
consumerism, they come to tolerate the exploitation of labor and even political
authoritarianism so long as the system sustains a rising standard of living.163

If “working-class culture,” the true driver of revolution, derived from the shared
experiences of material conditions, the dominance of capitalist hegemony had eliminated that
culture, radical theorists suggested. Social life, according to labor historian Stanley Aronowitz,
“is no longer organized around the common relation to the production of both culture and
commodities. The working class public sphere is dead.”
Social historian Eric Foner explored the implications of this perspective. “The seedbed of
socialist politics is a counter-hegemonic set of cultural institutions, rather than the polity or the
work place.”164 In this model, culture became important to radicals through the formation of
“counter-cultures” that allowed the development of the revolutionary spirit. Lawrence
Goodwyn’s Democratic Promise: The Populist Movement in America (1976) illustrated the
necessity of countercultures through a history of the Texas branch of the People’s Party in the
late nineteenth century. The shared struggles of farmers produced what Goodwyn termed an
"Alliance culture" where experiences became shared understandings, expectations, and values:
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The cooperative movement led to political education in terms of farmer-merchant,
farmer-creditor, and farmer-shipper relations and ... such education led to the ...
energizing self-perception of the farmer's subordinate place in the industrial
society…only the cooperative experience over a period of time provided the kind of
education that imparted to the political movement the specific form and substance of the
greenback heritage.165

This alliance culture is what gave the Populist their strength. However, as the movement grew it
lost much of its cooperative features. The national movement tried to reproduce it, but without
the actual shared experiences, it became a cheap imitation of the original. By the time the
Populists backed Democrat William Jennings Bryan for president in 1896, the party had become
"virtually issueless," Goodwyn argued, and "represented little more than a quest for honorable
men who would pledge themselves to forsake corrupt practices."166
A surprising result of the historiographical cultural turn was that it was, in a way,
reviving the “ethos” Consensus argument. Once again, one of the central concerns of cultural
scholars became the values of radicals and how they conformed to or diverged from the
dominant value system of the working class and the rest of society. Reviving the debate of
Consensus scholars Adolph Sturmthal and Marc Karson, authors such as social and literary critic
Irving Howe, and historian David DeLeon argued that the people of the United States were more
independent than their counterparts in Europe.
DeLeon pointed out in The American as Anarchist: Reflections on Indigenous Radicalism
(1978), how U.S. radicals have been prone to anti-statism. Whereas European radical movements
such as Scandinavian social democracy, Fabian bureaucratic socialism, and Soviet communism
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all entailed a high degree of state collectivism, U.S. radicals have been wary of centralization.
This has surfaced on both the extreme right, leaning towards libertarianism, as well as the left,
elements of which favor some form of anarchy or syndicalism.167 “American exceptionalism,”
Irving Howe notes in Socialism and America (1985), “has often taken the guise of querulous
anti-statism… It can veer toward an American version of anarchism, suspicious of all laws form,
and regulations… Tilt toward the right and you have the moralism of American reformers.”168
Specific examples of this can been seen in U.S. history. Historian Nick Salvatore in his
biography Eugene V. Debs: Citizen and Socialist (1982) defended the perennial socialist
presidential candidate when he lamented "the task of affirming a collective identity in a culture
that boasted of its individualistic mores."169 Historian William M. Dick, exploring Labor and
Socialism in America (1972), looked at the individualism of the U.S. labor movement and argued
that for much of its first half century, the AFL was in fact syndicalist, or advocated for workercontrolled industries. Gompers even described himself as “three-quarters anarchist.” And its
radical competitor, the IWW, went even farther and advocated anarcho-syndicalism, or the
proposed co-operative organization of society into a revolutionary, decentralized collection of
industrial worker syndicates. For a time, according to Dick, both regarded the state, as much as
private industry, as the enemy, and advocated for worker-controlled economy.170
Even the New Left evolved from anti-statist values, according to sociologist Richard
Flacks. One of the founders of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), a major student activist
movement of the 1960s, Flacks wrote in the 1990s,
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The dominant spirit of the 60s was neither social-democratic nor statist/Stalinist/Leninist,
but owed more to anarchist/pacifist/radical democratic traditions: Students and workers
should claim voice in the institutions they inhabit; communities and neighborhoods
should have democratic control over their futures; co-ops, communes, and collectives
should be the places to try alternative futures and practice authentic vocation… Here in
short was a thoroughgoing critique of statism, advanced not by the right but by young
Black and White activist/intellectuals devoted to a decentralizing, devolutionary, radicaldemocratic politics.171

Scholars such as Gordon Wood in The Creation of the American Republic: 1776-1787
(1969), and J.G.A. Pocock in The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the
Atlantic Republican Tradition (1975), speculated that the anti-statist value-system stemmed from
the small producer values of preindustrial United States. Unlike the Consensus academics who
emphasized the persistence of liberalism, these scholars contended that classic republicanism had
a greater influence on the nascent nation. Republican values such as popular sovereignty,
hostility to large accumulations of property, and the importance of industrial enterprise as the
bedrocks of an autonomous citizenry, they argued, created a small producer, artisan rural culture
which in turn produced an anti-statist tradition, even in U.S. radicals. 172

III.

The cultural turn brought previously unstudied aspects of popular culture to the forefront
of academia. Works such as Burton J. Bledstein’s The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle
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Class and the Development of Higher Education in America (1976) and David F. Noble’s
America by Design: Science, Technology and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism (1977) explored
the effects of the institutional and cultural transformation of the emergence of the professionalmanagerial class in corporate America.173 Barbara and John Ehrenreich used this new focus to
explain U.S. radicalism in an article in Radical America entitled “The New Left and the
Professional Managerial Class (1977).” The Ehrenreichs contend that a two-class method, where
everyone is in the proletariat except for a tiny ruling class, is not useful to explain the United
States, and needs to be updated to include the large and important professional sector that lie
between them. The fact that many of the nation’s radicals have come from this professionalmanagerial class, they argued, reduces the revolutionary potential of the United States.
According to this view, the managerial class serves to reduce class consciousness by absorbing a
certain percentage of the working-class and acts as a buffer by deflecting conflict away from the
capitalist class:
…the very existence of the PMC (professional-managerial class) is predicated on the
atomization of working-class life and culture and the appropriation of skill once vested in
the working class. The activities which the PMC performs within the capitalist division of
labor in themselves serve to undermine positive class consciousness among the working
class. The kind of consciousness which remains, the commonly held attitudes of the
working class, are as likely to be anti-PMC as they are to be anti-capitalist – if only
because people are more likely, in a day-to-day sense, to experience humiliation,
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harassment, frustration, etc. at the hands of the PMC than from members of the actual
capitalist class. 174

Ethnic studies was another academic specialty transformed by the infusion of cultural
parameters. Historian of immigration Rudolph Vecoli argued against the notion that immigrants
to the United States left their cultures behind. Instead Vecoli insisted that immigrants clung to
their traditions and developed strategies to retain their heritage and defy pressures to assimilate
into the U.S. social and economic system. It was this cultural aspect that, Vecoli asserted, made
immigrants unsusceptible to the appeals of socialism:
More important than the ‘material conditions of American capitalism’ in determining the
politics of ethnic groups appears to have been a calculus of cultural influences. Religion,
nationalism, and radicalism competed for the loyalty of the immigrants…

religio-

nationalistic identity proved to be highly resistant to the radical virus. Among the
Catholic and Slavic immigrants, such as the Poles and Slovaks, the socialist appeal,
regardless of the horrors of the steel mills and the packing houses, went largely unheeded.
Even among the radicals, the predominance of patriotism over internationalism was
conclusively demonstrated during the First World War. Following the outbreak of
hostilities, many socialists, especially those from subject nationalities of Eastern Europe,
rallied to the cause of national independence.175

Charles Leinenweber also acknowledged the importance of the cultural turn in the
investigations of ethnic and class history. “Cultural investigations of class formation stand as our
greatest achievement so far in developing a social history of twentieth-century working-class
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America,” noted Leinenweber. However, he pointed out “there are serious problems with this
cultural approach, which by now dominates historical thinking on the working class:
It attempts to leap past the tedious nuts-and-bolts work of building a literature on the
material conditions surrounding American working-class development simply by
asserting that they aren’t very important… Yet even as this approach claims a distinction
between culture and material conditions, it smuggles material factors back in as
cultural… Practically speaking, culture and material conditions don’t separate for the
very good reason that values, traditions, and institutions depend on certain material
circumstances for their flourishing. 176

IV.

The academic focus on culture and diversity led to the academic doctrine of
Multiculturalism, or the preservation and exploration of diverse cultures or cultural identities.
Universalism was replaced with relativity, while inclusion and diversity became the creed of the
day. Meanwhile, a conservative backlash emerged in the United States against the remnants of
New Left activism. In 1991 sociologist James Davidson Hunter coined the term “Culture Wars,”
to describe the United States of the 1980s and 1990s. Society, according to Hunter, was split on
ideological lines across a number of “hot-button” issues such as abortion, gun control, separation
of church and state, privacy, homosexuality, and censorship. The United States had gone from an
increasingly fragmented society of the 1970s to a polarized one by the 1990s. These conflicts had
been growing since the collapse of the New Deal electoral coalition in the 1970s, which set the
stage for the “Reagan Revolution” of the 1980s, during which the nation experienced a rightward
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shift under President Ronald Reagan’s supply-side economics policies, austerity plans, anticommunist rhetoric, and hostility to unions.177
A concurrent movement in the academic and intellectual sphere replicated the
“Neoconservative” drift in U.S. politics, influencing the way scholars addressed the absence of
socialism in the United States. Aileen Kraditor, a New Left Historian turned Neoconservative,
used a conservative perspective to elucidate her views on U.S. radicalism. In The Radical
Persuasion, 1890-1917: Aspects of the Intellectual History and the Historiography of Three
American Radical Organizations (1981), Kraditor pointed to the prevalence of values that
workers held over tradition, ethnicity, community, religion, and family that made radicalism
unappealing to the average person. Beyond the prevalence of traditional values, Kraditor
contended that workers in the early twentieth were able to carve out independent enclaves where
they could live their lives according to these beliefs in a certain degree of autonomy:
The millions of anonymous John Q. Workers who went to work every day and went home to their
families every night and could never see the radicals' ideology as a better explanation for their
lives than the ones that they subscribed to and that made their experiences meaningful to them178

In addition to attributing traditional values and identification with small communities to
U.S. workers, Kraditor also laid blame on radicals themselves. The I.W.W., the Socialist Labor
Party, and the Socialist Party were all guilty of foolish and incorrect strategies, she maintained,
based on a false view of workers in the United States. This was because their theories "had been
formulated aprioristically.... It was the gap between the abstraction they called the Worker and
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the real John Q. Worker that, in the final analysis, defeated them."179 Radical scholars,
admonished Kraditor, treat “John Q. Worker's life and belief system as having had no meaning
other than in relation to capitalist oppression and the historically assigned mission to destroy
it.”180
A similar take on the failure of U.S. socialism characterized the work of American
Studies Professor James Nuechterlein, who simply suggested that U.S. capitalism was better, and
therefore won. Nuechterlein traced this reading to Werner Sombart’s affluence and social
mobility theses. Yet radical historians refused to accept this. “Rather than ponder the obvious,”
he contended,
Radicals prefer to take refuge in the obfuscations of “false consciousness.” The people
may choose, but they do not choose well, bemused as they are by the encompassing
“hegemonic” values of bourgeois culture.

Not only is this interpretation wrong, Nuechterlein claimed, but it also robbed workers of
agency:
If, however, we free ourselves from obscurantist categories and begin to address on their
own terms the decisions made by people in the past, we might obtain a less
condescending view of working-class consciousness. We might see that most workers
and their families, recognizing instinctively the limits and trade-offs all social systems
impose, sensed that life within the American industrial system, for all its burden offered
them more than did any realistic alternative…

Nuechterlein insisted that radical scholars treated workers as fools. However, if they took
a moment to consider the benefits of capitalism, he suggested, workers could be viewed as not
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misled, but making a conscious decision to participate in the system that provided them the
highest likelihood of benefit. And the benefits were indeed tangible:
As Stephan Thernstrum and others have reminded us, that rags-to respectability was a
real possibility. In that sense, the American Dream was not a fraud; social mobility did
exist, as did rising real wages. So also the political system… offered more participation,
more accessibility, more responsiveness to the concerns of people like themselves than
did that of any other country. 181

Nuechterlein’s emphasis on the success of U.S. capitalism was unsurprisingly popular
with many neo-conservative thinkers. And this victorious attitude was seemingly vindicated as
the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 triggered the collapse of worldwide Communism and
signaled the apparent supremacy of U.S capitalism. U.S. political scientist Francis Fukuyama
summed it up as the “end of history.” The worldwide struggles had been decided and now
Western liberal capitalist democracies would spread across the globe as the endpoint of
humanity’s sociocultural evolution.182
The end of the Cold War seemed to herald the ostensible defeat of radicalism just as a
conservative turn had shifted the U.S. political landscape to the right. The once menacing specter
of socialism now seemed ridiculous or puerile. The question of why it had failed began to fade
out of view. And when it was approached it often times took a regretful lament.
Historian Mark Pittenger’s 1993 intellectual history of socialist movements in the United
States, American Socialists and Evolutionary Thought: 1870-1920, argued that nineteenth
century evolutionism had affected socialist thought. Evolutionist principles had supplanted
theoretical Marxism, contended Pittenger, leading U.S socialists to accept the gradual, seemingly
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inevitable evolution of society through reform. Evolutionary thought also explained why U.S.
socialists were not as critical of racism, sexism, and nativism, as they could have been.183 Brian
Lloyd's Left Out: Pragmatism, Exceptionalism, and the Poverty of American Marxism (1997),
pursued the same line but insisted that during and after Debs, Socialists relied too heavily on
experience and pragmatism. This moderate version of U.S. socialism supposedly watered down
Marxist principles to the point where they were no more significant than the reformism of the
Progressives. 184
These accounts have an unmistakable tinge of regret for what might have been. Both
Pittenger and Lloyd accuse the socialists of having played it too safe and been defeated as a
result. Reflecting his disappointment with the collapse of the left in contemporary United States
and a cynical view of political movements, Lloyd wrote that,
No matter how patiently it was awaited or urgently it was summoned, no natural agent of
revolution emerged from the cauldron of modern industry. Trade unionism has never, of
its own volition, transmuted into anti-capitalism; no electoral socialist, on either side of
the Atlantic, has used a bourgeois state to dismantle capitalism.185

The rest of the explanations around the turn of the millennium took the form of selfcongratulatory vindications. Consensus era political Scientist Seymour Lipset’s essay “The End
of Exceptionalism?” proclaimed that not only did U.S. capitalism’s benefits outweigh
socialism’s, but it also did a better job at achieving socialism’s goals than socialism ever could.
The United States, Lipset claimed, “is closer to their ideological goal of a socially classless and
weak state society than any system they knew in their lifetime.” Repeating Samson’s line from
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the 1930s, he noted, “American radicals were unable to sell socialism to a people who believed
they already lived in a society which operationally, though not terminologically, was committed
to egalitarian objectives.”186
The United States’ victory not only ended the Cold War, Lispet argued, but ended
American Exceptionalism as well. “No major tendency, left or right, retains a belief in a utopia,
in a solution for all major problems by dramatically reconstructing society and polity… The
United States is no longer as exceptional politically.”187 This was not because the United States
had lost anything, but because it had remade the world over in its image. Lipset’s consensus had
once again returned. And this time it was worldwide. There was now no socialism anywhere.
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CONCLUSION

For over a century the Question “Why is there no socialism in the United States” has
plagued thinkers both revolutionary and reactionary. But for all the effort put into it, are we
really any closer to finding an answer? The responses have ranged from consideration of U.S.
extremism to notions of U.S. passivity, from political freedom in the United States to its crushing
repression, from the failure to tap the treasure trove of potential in The United States’ immigrant
or working class populations to radical movements dragged down by the conservatism of those
same groups.
Often times if a question has no clear answer, it is because we have been asking the
wrong question. Agreeing with this sentiment, Eric Foner has suggested a reexamination of the
way we approach the absence of U.S. socialism. Scholars generally are not actually asking “why
is America not a socialist nation?” or even “why is there no major socialist party in the United
States?” contends Foner. In realty they are simply asking why does the United States not have
more of a working class consciousness or labor-based party like the ones in Western Europe. Yet
after examining the movements of Western Europe, Foner concludes that they too have been
“incapable of using their impressive political strength to reshape fundamentally their societies:”
They have, one might say, promoted liberalism and egalitarianism more successfully than
socialism, and presented themselves as the proponents of modernization and social rationalization
rather than class rule, thus operating in way more analogous to American political parties than
either Americans or Europeans would care to admit.188

Akin to Seymour Lipset’s conclusion, New Left social historian Eric Foner suggests that
rather than lagging behind Europe, perhaps it is as Marx put it so many decades ago, “the
188
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country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its
own future” In other words the U.S. system may hold the key to the future:
Perhaps, because mass politics, mass culture, and mass consumption came to America
before it did to Europe, American socialist were the first to face the dilemma of how to
define socialist politics in a capitalist democracy. Perhaps, in the dissipation of class
ideologies, Europe is now catching up with a historical process already experienced in the
United States… Only time will tell whether the United States has been behind Europe in
the development of socialism, or ahead of it, in socialism’s decline.
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Unlike Foner, economic and intellectual historian James Livingston posits that perhaps
the question is not “why is there no socialism in the United States?” but rather, “why is there still
socialism in the United States?” Livingston pointed out in The World Turned Inside Out:
American Thought and Culture at the End of the 20th Century (2009), that even after the Reagan
revolution and the rightward shift of the nation, there was still a “dizzying range of regulatory
agencies, federal statues, and executive orders which, then as now, limit the reach of the market”
as well as “thousands of nongovernmental organizations and nonprofit institutions that stand
athwart the free market, modulating and containing its arbitrary forces.”190 Behind the rhetoric,
insisted Livingston, the United States was still devoted in many ways to a welfare state, the
ultimate expression of the desire for economic egalitarianism.
Even U.S. culture, Livingston suggests “was much more liberal, open, and electric in
1990 than in 1980, and then again in 2000, no matter how you frame the issues of gender,
sexuality, and race, no matter how you characterize music, movies, and other performance
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arts.”191 Historian and writer Michael Kazin goes even further, in American Dreamers: How the
Left Changed a Nation (2011), by claiming that, in a way, socialism has succeeded. Though the
left had failed to produce a sweeping political program, he argues, it had succeeded in
transforming society through altering and redefining its “moral culture.” Kazin claims that the
left can claim victory for bending the political discourse of the nation towards justice and is
directly responsible for the contemporary movements for gay rights, eco-sustainability, civil
rights, and social justice. 192
When looked at from this perspective, the discord over U.S. radicalism becomes
understandable, as we can see that, in fact, scholars have not even all been asking the same
question. Each exploration of the topic is really asking an entirely different question. The early
socialists were asking, “When will there be socialism?” while the Progressives asked, “How can
there be no socialism?” During the Consensus Era it was, “Why, thank God, is there no
socialism?” and for the New Left it was either “Why, Goddammit, is there no socialism?” or
“How can there be socialism?” The Cultural Studies scholars asked, “Why can’t there be
socialism?” and the Neoconservatives proudly declared, “There can be socialism!”
Instead of Seymour Lipset’s assessment that we have moved beyond American
Exceptionalism to a new worldwide consensus, it is more likely that Lipset offers us a particular
point of view from a particular vantage point. Writing at the turn of the 21st century, there was
much to be hopeful for. The United States emerged from the Cold War as the solitary undisputed
superpower. Its economy remained the most productive in the world and was spurred along even
further by the technological and communications boom following the invention of the World
Wide Web. “These post Cold War conditions,” boasted a hopeful Lispet,
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bode well for democratic stability and for international peace. It has become an
undocumented truism that democracies do not wage war against each other and most of
the world is now democratic. While extremist movements and parties exist, all of them
are weak…193

As is often is the case, however, just when peace and stability finally seemed within
grasp, they slip through the cracks. In the United States, the new millennium started with a
recession resulting from the collapse of the dotcom bubble, followed shortly by the terrorist
attacks of September 11th, 2001. The ensuing decade witnessed wars, terrorism, and instances of
U.S. initiated torture, which split the political and social fabric of the country to levels unheard
of since the 1960s. The collapse of the housing market in 2008 then brought about the Great
Recession as the economic stability of millions of people in the United States was thrown into
doubt.
As the nation’s youth entered the worst job market since the 1930s, with levels of student
debt at unprecedentedly high levels, some young people began to reconsider the utopian claims
surrounding capitalism. This leftward turn found expression in the groundswell of support for
Barack Obama’s presidential candidacy and the Occupy Wall Street protests of 2011, which
brought income inequality to the forefront of U.S. discourse once again.
To this generation the Soviet Union was either a distant, or non-existent memory. Freed
from this burden, some dissidents turned to Marxism to explain the problems within society.
Starting journals like Jacobin, n+1, and Dissent, these “Millennial Marxists” for the first time in
decades readdressed the issues surrounding U.S. radicalism.194 The French Economist Thomas
Piketty’s work on income inequality, Capital in Twenty-First Century (2013), has quickly
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become a best seller and Alyssa Battistoni, a graduate student in political science at Yale, has
captured attention with her calls for the merging of Marxism with the modern environmental
movement in a piece for Jacobin entitled “Toward a Cyborg Socialism (2014).”195
Rather than suppose that this generation will be the one to usher in socialism in the
United States, the resurgence of radical discourse should instead be appreciated for the
opportunity to examine modern society a little closer. Nikil Saval, an editor at n+1, attempts to
tie the lack of U.S. socialism to emergence of the white-collar sector. In his book Cubed (2014),
Saval claims that the post-industrial U.S. workforce has been trapped in the white-collar factories
of “the office,” and become more isolated and alienated.196 Saval and other Millennial Marxists
reveal the distrust and despair of this new generation toward the promises made by the U.S.
capitalist system. But perhaps more importantly, they show us that there will never be an end of
history. There will always be someone to imagine a different way of organizing society, and to
wonder “why not?”
And this reveals the true value of this exercise. It is not the answers, nor the questions,
that are important to this inquiry, but rather, the glimpse they afford into both the mind and soul
of the United States. These examinations tell us as much about U.S. radicalism as they do about
the academic community that studied them. And as Sally Miller observed, “historians, creatures
of the U.S. experience, were molded by forces in society, as was the Socialist Party. It, too, was
shaped and formed by the attitudes of the nation.”197 Scholars are just as much a product of their
environment, as are the radicals they study. And by tracing the evolution of the question “why is
there no socialism in the United States?” we not only gain insight into the history of the United
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States and radical politics, but also come to appreciate how the history of ideas and historical
trends shape intellectual discourse and are, in turn, shaped by them.
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